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Adventures in the Article V Wonderland:
Justiciability and Legal Sufficiency of the
ERA Ratifications
Danaya C. Wright*

This Article examines the paradoxicalworld of Article V-the amending power of
the Constitution-inlight of the recent ratificationof the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).
It explores the question of whether Article V issues arejusticiable, what role the federal and
state courtsplay in determiningArticle Vprocedures, and who has thejurisdiction to evaluate
the legal sufficiengi of state ratifications. This is a confounding area of law, and with a few

judicialprecedents, some textualism and originalism arguments, and recourse to logic and
scholarship, I conclude that the ERA is validly the Twenty-Eighth Amendment. I provide a
detailed analysis of the congressionaldeadline and rescission issues that are currently before
the courts and explore the unique role of the states in exercising their Article V powers to
effect constitutionalchange.

* T. Terrell Sessums & Gerald Sohn Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Florida, Frederic
G. Levin College of Law. I would like to thank Professor Jon Mills and Dean Laura Rosenbury for their
assistance in writing this Article. I would also like to thank Winsome McIntosh and the McIntosh
Foundation for their financial support, and the efforts of Levi Bradford, Caroline Bradley, Andrea
Hartung, Kate Magill, and Aleksandra Osterman-Burgess for their research support. I have presented
this work at numerous conferences, including the Loyola University Chicago Constitutional Law
Colloquium and at the American Constitution Society Constitutional Law Scholars Forum at Barry
University. I would like to thank all of the commentators and participants who made invaluable
suggestions, as well as Alexander Tsesis and Eang Ngov for their comments and support.
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INTRODUCTION

In Lewis Carroll's Aice's Adventures in Wonderland, Alice chases a white rabbit
down a rabbit hole where she drinks tea with the Mad Hatter, chats up the Cheshire
Cat, plays croquet with a flamingo, eats a mushroom that makes her shrink, and
stands trial for stealing the Queen of Hearts' tarts.' During her adventure, she
changes size, cries an ocean of tears, is asked, "Why is a raven like a writing

1.

Co. 1920).

See generaly LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADvENTURES IN WONDERLAND (Macmillan
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desk?", and seeks the advice of a caterpillar smoking a hookah.2 Alice's Wonderland
is known by all to be a world of riddles, absurdities, puns, mathematical satires, and
historical references. Carroll's beloved novel reminds us that the reality we take for
granted is contested, that truths are relative, and that logic is a flawed endeavor. Yet
we read the novel convinced that we can figure out its hidden meaning if we only
try hard enough.
Article V of the U.S. Constitution, the amending provision, is similarly
paradoxical. 3 Its pattern of interconnected relationships, logical gaps, and
agonizingly spare direction make analyzing the process of amending the
Constitution much like trying to make sense of Alice's adventures. One can fall into
any part of it and be led on an analytical journey that is remarkably full of
unanswered questions, absurd results, and fallacious riddles. Yet at the end of the
day, we have added twenty-seven amendments 4 without suffering a constitutional
breakdown, 5 and we have persisted in our collective belief that there is some sense
of order or legitimacy in the process.6 This has been due, in large part, to our willful
avoidance of certain rabbit holes and acceptance of certain outcomes despite the
incontrovertible fact that underneath the patina of procedural regularity lie a swamp
of irregularities and acts of questionable legality. But as with the unclothed emperor,
the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) has pulled back the curtain
on the dizzyingly convoluted and indeterminate process flaws of Article V.

2.
Id. at 97.
3.
See U.S. CONST. art. V.
4.
Arguably it is twenty-eight amendments now with the Equal Rights Amendment.
Twenty-eight have met the technical requirements of Article V but only twenty-seven have
been published.
5.
Although we did have a near-breakdown in the 1860s when Congress proposed the
Fourteenth Amendment with fewer than two-thirds majorities since the Southern Congressional
delegations were excluded, and it was passed by recalcitrant legislatures in many states. Some have
argued, even quite recently, that the Fourteenth Amendment was improperly ratified and therefore
ultra vires, but no one seriously imagines that we could put that genie back in the bottle. See generaly
Douglas H. Bryant, Comment, Unorthodox and Paradox: Revisiting the Ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 53 ALA. L. REV. 555, 556 (2002) (arguing the Fourteenth Amendment was not
constitutionally proposed or ratified); John Harrison, The Lafulness of the ReconstructionAmendments,
68 U. CHI. L. REV. 375, 375 (2001) (recognizing the irregularities in the Reconstruction Amendments
and suggesting that the Constitution does not "invalidate ratifications made in the face of
illegal threats"); Thomas B. Colby, Orginalism and the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
107 Nw. U. L. REV. 1627, 1629 (2013) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment "can claim no warrant
to democratic legitimacy through original popular sovereignty"). The courts, however, have rejected
challenges to the legitimacy of the Reconstruction Amendments. Seegeneraly White v. Hart, 80 U.S. 646
(1871); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922); U.S. v. Gugel, 119 F. Supp. 897 (E.D. Ky. 1954).
6.
See generaly DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776-2015 (2016). Kyvig argues that where amendments have occurred,
the changes have been more lasting, while legislative responses to social problems during the New
Deal and World War II eras have been more transient because they were not enshrined in the
Constitution. Id.
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On January 27, 2020, Virginia became the thirty-eighth state to ratify the Equal
Rights Amendment.7 However, despite having met the amending requirements of
Article V, the ERA has not been published by the National Archivist (Archivist) as
the Twenty-Eighth Amendment, as required by federal statute.8 It remains in
legitimacy limbo 9 awaiting resolution of numerous legal questions. Lamentably, the
process of amending the Constitution and the procedures for ensuring that the
Article V process is correctly followed are woefully underdeveloped. Moreover, for
nearly two-and-a-half centuries, a number of procedural questions have lurked in
the shadows of other constitutional amendments, potentially undermining their
legitimacy and providing scope for legal challenges.1 0 Yet no prior amendment has
thrust us so directly down the rabbit hole that is Article V.
The ERA was born in procedural irregularity. It was first proposed in 1923,
but it took a procedural technicality to get it out of committee, where it had
languished for nearly fifty years, and to the House floor for a vote.11 It was sent to
the states by Congress in 1972, but it was saddled with a seven-year deadline when
submitted for ratification.1 2 Only thirty-five states had ratified by the end of the
seven-year deadline, and five states had purported to rescind their ratifications. In

7.
S.J. Res. 1, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020). See Complaint at 10-11, Virginia v. Ferriero,
466 F. Supp. 3d 253 (D.D.C. 2020) (N. 1:20-cv-00242).
8.
1 U.S.C. § 106(b). On December 12, 2018, the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA) sent a letter to the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC) asking it to weigh in on what exactly the Archivist should do if a thirty-eighth state ratified the
ERA. The Archivist had been asked by Members of Congress to clarify what action he planned to take.
While acknowledging that, "under 1 U.S.C. § 106b, he would be expected to publish the amendment to
the Constitution when the requisite number of states have ratified it," the Archivist "request[ed] that
OLC provide the Archivist with guidance on his role[.]" Letter from Gary M. Stern, General Counsel,
The National Archives and Records Administration, to Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.archives.gov/files/press/press-releases/
2020/olc-letter-re-era-ratification.12-12-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3X2-AW5V]. A little more
than one year later, the OLC issued a slip opinion in response, stating that it believed the Archivist
could not certify the ERA because Congress's original deadline was binding and the post-1979
ratifications were thus invalid. See Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment, 44 Op. O.L.C., slip
op. at 1 (Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/1232501/download [https://penna.cc/LA9E936S]. Two days after OLC published this opinion, NARA issued a press release stating that it "defers
to DOJ on this issue and will abide by the OLC opinion, unless otherwise directed by a final court
order." Press Release, National Archives and Records Administration, NARA Press Statement on the
Equal Rights Amendment (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.archives.gov/press/press-releases-4
[https://perma.cc/6FMZ-5R7C].
9.
Brendon Troy Ishikawa, Eveything You Always Wanted to Know About How Amendments
Are Made, but Were Afraid to Ask, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 545, 570 (1997).
10. Supreme Court litigation on procedural irregularities has centered around the controversial
Eighteenth, Nineteenth, and Child Labor Amendments during a period of constitutional panic as six
amendments in two decades were successful and the Child Labor Amendment was looking likely to
succeed. KYVIG, supra note 6, at 240-67.
11. Representative Martha Griffiths of Michigan used a discharge petition to get the proposal
out of the House Judiciary Committee, where Representative Emanuel Celler had refused to let it out.
Id. at 404.
12. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92nd Cong., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972).
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1978, Congress extended the deadline by three years and three months, until June
22, 1982; however, no states ratified or rescinded during the extension period.
When the ratification period expired, the proposal lacked either three or eight
ratifications to reach the thirty-eight required by Article V. Thirty-five years later,
in 2017, Nevada ratified the ERA; Illinois did so in 2018; and Virginia did in 2020.13
It took forty-nine years to get the ERA out of Congress and forty-eight years to be
ratified, making that seven-year deadline on ratification look remarkably
unreasonable.1 4 With these three additional ratifications, a number of legal issues
are no longer mere abstractions but pose direct, unresolved legal questions about
the scope and interpretation of the Article V process.
On the face of it, the questions seem straightforward. There are two
substantive legal issues that require resolution to determine the validity of the ERA,
but these rely on a whole host of underlying procedural issues. First, it must be
determined if the seven-year deadline for ratification is a permissible exercise of
Congress's Article V powers or if it is an impermissible infringement of the states'
sole power to control ratification.1 5 Because no deadline has actually operated to
potentially void an amendment that has met the technical requirements of Article
V, all prior deadline concerns have been either moot or unripe.1 6 It may also be
necessary to determine, if Congress does have the power to impose a deadline,
13.
S.J. Res. Const. Amend. 4, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2018); S.J. Res. 2, 79th
Leg. Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2017); S.J. Res. 1, 161st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020); see also Danaya
C. Wright, "Great Variety of Relevant Conditions, Political, Social and Economic": The Constitutionality

of CongressionalDeadlines on Amendment Proposals Under Article V, 28 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 45,
45 n.2, 46 nn.11-13 (2019).
14. Numerous scholars have shown that the holdup for all constitutional amendments has
been Congress, which has rarely acted quickly or forthrightly in proposing constitutional
amendments. See, e.g., Herman Ames, The Amending Provision of the FederalConstitution in Practice, in
63 PROCS. AM. PHIL. SOC'Y 62 (1924); see also RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN WITH JEROME AGEL,
AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LOVE THE CONSTITUTION SO MUCH, WHY DO WE KEEP TRYING TO

CHANGE IT? (1993).
15.
Scholars have analyzed this issue and generally consider that it is impermissible. Seegeneraly
Mason Kalfus, Comment, Why Time Limits on the Ratification of ConstitutionalAmendments Violate
Article V, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 437 (1999); Wright, supra note 13 passim; Michael C. Hanlon, Note, The
Needfor a GeneralTime Limit on Ratification of Proposed ConstitutionalAmendments, 16 J.L. & POL. 663
(2000); Allison L. Held, Sheryl L. Herndon & Danielle M. Stager, The Equal Rights Amendment: Why
the ERA Remains Legally Viable and Properly Before the States, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 113
(1997). Those scholars who accept that Congress may impose a time limit generally concede that
Congress may change or waive the limit if the deadline is located in the preamble, as is the case with
the ERA. See Robert Hajdu & Bruce E. Rosenblum, Note, The Process of ConstitutionalAmendment, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 106, 127 (1979); Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of ConstitutionalChange:Rethinking
the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386, 425 (1983) (suggesting that deadlines in the proposal
may be valid but not in the preamble).
16.
In the only case to discuss a deadline directly, Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921), the issue
was arguably moot because the amendment had been ratified within the deadline. The Eighteenth and
Twentieth through Twenty-Sixth Amendments, with a deadline in either the text or the preamble, were
all ratified within the time allowed. The D.C. Representation Amendment is the only outstanding
proposal that has not been ratified within the deadline. And the ERA is now the only outstanding
proposal that was ratified after the deadline expired.
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whether it may extend, shorten, or waive the deadline after the proposal has gone
to the states.17
Second, it must be determined if the five states that purportedly rescinded
their ratifications may do so, thus necessitating additional state ratifications
potentially beyond the three-fourths required by Article V. Although states have
attempted to rescind in the past, no rescission has ever been recognized as valid,
and the courts have not weighed in on the matter.18 These two substantive questions
represent only the first sally in our Article V analysis, however. As we try to ascertain
the likely answers to these two questions, we find ourselves twisting around in a
dizzying procedure maze, like Alice and the dodo in the Caucus-race.
Congress has made no laws governing the ratification procedures of the states,
and doing so would raise serious constitutional questions, so matters involving the
legal sufficiency of the three late ratifications, or the ratifications that were
rescinded, are of first impression even though numerous questions about state
ratifications have arisen in the past.1 9 Once an amendment has been ratified, the
Archivist is tasked with publishing that fact.20 But what does the Archivist do if
there are genuine questions as to whether the states have actually ratified? His is a
ministerial duty, and the statute does not authorize the Archivist to judge the legal
sufficiency of the ratifications he has received. However, at the time of writing, the
Archivist has not published the ERA as the Twenty-Eighth Amendment. 2 1 He relies
on a Department of Justice interpretation that the seven-year deadline is valid to

17.
Numerous scholars argued that Congress could change the deadline during the ERA
extension debates. See, e.g., Dellinger, supra note 15; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Ratfi cation of the Equal
Rights Amendment: A Question of Time, 57 TEX. L. REV. 919 (1979); Jean Witter, Extending Ratification

Time for the Equal Rights Amendment: Constitutionaliy of Time Limitations in the FederalAmending
Process, 4 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 209 (1978). Others claimed it was impermissible. See Grover
Rees III, Throwing Away the Key: The Unconstitutionality of the Equal Rights Amendment Extension,
58 TEX. L. REv. 875 (1980); Orrin G. Hatch, The Equal Rights Amendment Extension: A Critical
Analysis, 2 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 19 (1979).
18.
There is extensive scholarship around the rescission issue with the general conclusion that
rescissions are currently ineffective, but some have argued that they should be allowed. See, e.g., Leo
Kanowitz & Marilyn Klinger, Can A State Rescind Its Equal Rights Amendment Ratification: Who
Decides and How?, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 979 (1977); A. Diane Baker, Comment, ERA: The Effect of
Extending the Time for Ratification on Attempts to Rescind Prior Ratifications,28 EMORY L.J. 71 (1979);
William L. Dunker, Comment, Constitutional Amendments-The Justiciabiliy of Ratfication and
Retraction, 41 TENN. L. REV. 93 (1973); Judith L. Elder, Article V, Justiciability, and the Equal Rights
Amendment, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 63 (1978); Ishikawa, supra note 9, at 550; Hajdu & Rosenblum, supra
note 15, at 171. see Seegeneralfy Michael Stokes Paulsen,A General Theoy ofArticle V: The Constitutional
Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 726 (1993) (proposing a theory that
would allow for rescissions). The one court that did address the issue of rescissions, Idaho v. Freeman,
529 E Supp. 1107 (D. Idaho 1981) saw its opinion vacated by the Supreme Court when the issue
became moot. Carmen v. Idaho, 459 U.S. 809 (1982).
19. See discussion infra Sections III.A and III.B.
20.
1 U.S.C. § 106(b).
21.
See discussion infra notes 322-340 and accompanying text as to the ministerial duty of
the Archivist.
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justify his failure to act.22 That reliance may violate his statutory obligation and
potentially interpose the executive branch into the Article V amendment process.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that an amendment becomes valid
immediately upon ratification by the last state and that ratification certificates are
conclusive, regardless of allegations of legal insufficiency. 23 So is the ERA already
the Twenty-Eighth Amendment? Finally, Supreme Court precedent has been
interpreted to suggest that determining the answer to some or all of these questions
might fall within the political question doctrine and should be left to Congress, one
of the parties whose Article V powers is being questioned. 24 Allowing Congress to
decide is a bit like allowing the Queen of Hearts to accuse Alice the witness of being
Alice the tart thief.
After repeated perambulations through the Article V wonderland, we find that
the amending provision is a lot like the Swiss cheese served at the Mad Hatter's tea
party-it is full of holes, completely unsatisfying, and raises more questions than
answers. To get a handle on the complex issues underlying the ERA, one must first
understand the process of amendment, the role of the Archivist, and the specific
steps in the finely wrought procedure of Article V. Then, before we can decide if
Congress has the power to impose a deadline on the states, or whether the states
can rescind their ratifications, we need to consider the justiciability of these
questions. What power the Archivist has to seek an opinion from the Office of
Legislative Counsel (OLC), and what power the Archivist has to rely on that
opinion, are also contested issues. 25 But until we know who will be deciding these
questions, we cannot know whether the Archivist has breached his statutory duty
to publish the Amendment. And who decides if the state ratifications are valid?
Until we know the answers to these questions, we cannot begin to determine
whether the states have overreached in rescinding or whether Congress has
overreached in imposing a deadline.
In this Article, I focus first on the Article V process and its indeterminacy,
exploring many of its gaps and ambiguities, including numerous procedural
irregularities that have occurred in the past. I then analyze the role of the various
parties in resolving those irregularities, including state legislatures, state courts,
Congress, and the federal courts. I explore the Court's enigmatic opinions in Leser

22.
Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment, supra note 8, at 2.
23.
Seegeneray Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922).
24.
As discussed more fully below in Section I.C.2, the Supreme Court has suggested, although
not held, that these procedural issues may be nonjusticiable political questions in Coleman v. Miller, 307
U.S. 433 (1939).
25.
The State of Virginia sued the Archivist in the District Court for the District of Columbia,
alleging that the deadline is unconstitutional and that the rescissions are ineffective and that
consequently the ERA has become the Twenty-Eighth Amendment. Virginia v. Ferriero, 525
F. Supp. 3d 36 (D.D.C. 2021), appeal docketed, No. 21-5096 (D.C. Cir. May 7, 2021). The case was
dismissed on March 5, 2021 for lack of standing and is on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the
DC Circuit. See id. at 48-49.
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v. Garnett,2 6 that state certificates of ratification are conclusive on the courts, and in
Coleman v. Miller,27 that Article V issues might be nonjusticiable political questions.
These two opinions, in tandem, create a paradox that would have us running in
circles like Alice in the Caucus-race. Working logically through the multitude of
diverse directions, I offer a path forward in affirming the role of the federal courts
in interpreting the Constitution and maintaining the federalism balance envisioned
by the Framers. Although I do not go into great detail about the deadline and
rescission issues on their merits because I have written about them more fully
elsewhere, 28 I provide a brief analysis of their principal points and explain how they
fit into our confusing Article V jurisprudence. After a discussion of the Archivist's
role in this complicated process, I conclude the Article with the reminder that
despite the constitutional panic of the 1920s and 1930s that prompted virtually all
of our Supreme Court precedent on the subject, judicially manageable standards
exist for resolving these issues, and they should be resolved now in favor of the
ERA because it has met the technical requirements of Article V. At no time in our
nearly two-and-a-half centuries has an amendment been voided when it has
otherwise satisfied the Article V process, and now is not a time to deviate from that
well-worn path even if the White Rabbit is enticing us down the rabbit hole with
his proclamations of being late for a very important date.
I. EPILOGUE TO A PROLOGUE: THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE V

Article V sets out three steps for amending the Constitution and assigns those
steps to either the states or to Congress. In its terse ninety words, Article V provides:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary,
shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of
the legislatures of two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention
for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all
intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the
legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three
fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be
proposed by the Congress; .... 29
According to this provision, Congress and the states share the power to
propose constitutional amendments. The Framers originally gave only the states the
power to propose amendments, but Congress was given a shared power late in the
debates because it was assumed that Congress would be more attuned to the needs

26.
27.
28.

258 U.S. 130 (1922).
307 U.S. 433 (1939).
See Wright, supra note 13, on the deadline issue, and Danaya C. Wright, "An Atrocious

Way to Run a Constitution": The Destabilizing Effects of Constitutional Amendment Rescissions,
59 DUQ. L. REV. 12 (2021) on the rescission issue.
29.
U.S. CONST. art. V. The remaining text of Article V imposes two limitations on the
amending power that are irrelevant for our purposes: senate representation may not be diluted without
a state's consent, and the slavery provisions may not be amended before 1808. Id.
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of the national government and more willing than the states to propose changes
that it deemed necessary. 30 To date, every constitutional amendment has originated
from Congress, although thousands of state petitions for a convention have fallen
upon deaf ears. 3 1 Congress is also given the sole power to determine the mode of
ratification, as between state legislatures and state conventions. To date, all but one
amendment has been ratified by state legislatures; only the Twenty-First
Amendment was ratified by state conventions. The states have the sole power to
ratify, either by legislature or convention, as dictated by Congress. Article V states
that amendments shall be deemed "valid ... when ratified by the legislatures of
three-fourths of the several states .... "32 Ratification by the states is, therefore, the
final legally operative act in this multistep drama, and the Court has held that the
amendment becomes effective immediately. 33 Although Congress and the President
have occasionally "approved" or "accepted" an amendment in the past, it is now
generally accepted that Congress has no role in accepting or affirming an
amendment. 34 Similarly, the Supreme Court held that the President has no role in
the amending function. 35
The relatively spare language of Article V does not expressly provide Congress
the power to impose deadlines on the states for ratification, nor does it expressly
permit states to rescind their prior ratifications. It does not give Congress the power
to determine when or whether an amendment has been ratified. Nor does it grant
to Congress any power to determine the legal sufficiency of state ratifications.
There is no explicit role for the executive or judicial branches, and there are no
guidelines as to how the states shall ratify. As James Madison mused, such
"difficulties ... as to the form, the quorum, &c .... in Constitutional regulations

30.
Roger Sherman proposed allowing Congress to also propose amendments along with the
states. See BERNSTEIN & AGEL, supra note 14, at 19. Hamilton first broached the idea, stating, "The
State Legislatures will not apply for alterations but with a view to increase their own powers-The
National Legislature will be the first to perceive and will be most sensible to the necessity of
amendments, and ought also to be empowered, whenever two-thirds of each branch should concur to
call a Convention-There could be no danger in giving this power, as the people would finally decide
in the case." Id. at 18-19.
Gerald Benjamin & Thomas Gais, ConstitutionalConventionphobia,1 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y
31.
SYMP. 53, 56 (1996); Robert G. Natelson, Proposing ConstitutionalAmendments by Convention: Rules
Governing the Process, 78 TENN. L. REv. 693, 697 (2011); see also JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, AND AMENDING ISSUES, 1789-2002,

at 108, 507 (2nd ed. 2003).
32.
U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added).
33.
Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921) (holding that a criminal defendant was properly subject
to the Volstead Act, passed under authority of the Eighteenth Amendment, which became effective
one year after ratification).
34.
See Congressional Pay Amendment, 16 Op. O.L.C. 85, 99 (1992) ("[C]ongressional
promulgation is neither required by Article V nor consistent with constitutional practice.").
35.
Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dallas) 378, 379 (1798); see also Seth Barrett Tillman,

A Textualist Defense ofArticle I, Section 7 Clause 3: Why Hollingsworth v. Virginia Was Rzightly Decided,
and Wihy INS v. Chadha Was Wrongl Reasoned, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1275 (2005).
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ought to be as much as possible avoided." 36 In response, Richard Bernstein and
Jerome Agel explain, "[a]s with so many other parts of the Constitution, the scope
of the amending process codified in Article V awaited definition by those who
would seek to wield it in the future." 37 Nearly two-and-a-half centuries later, we are
still awaiting that definition.
A. Down the Rabbit Hole: Into the Article V Wonderland
Like Alice falling down the rabbit hole, trying to unravel Article V procedure
is a bit like having a conversation with the Queen of Hearts. Despite its deceptive
simplicity-Congress proposes an amendment, the requisite number of states ratify,
and voila!, the amendment becomes a part of the Constitution-there is so much
uncertainty in the process that once one begins to think about it, one's head quickly
starts to spin. It is truly remarkable that things have worked as well as they have
so far.38
To see why that is, consider what would happen if amendments had not passed
quite so smoothly in the past. For instance, what if the House of Representatives
voted to propose an amendment one year and the Senate refused to take it up that
year but took it up the next year and passed it with the requisite two-thirds majority?
There is nothing in Article V that mandates that both houses of Congress must pass
a joint resolution to propose an amendment in the same year. And yet congressional
rules and historical precedent establish that both houses of Congress must vote on
a joint resolution in the same session. 39 The fact that Article V says nothing about
when or how Congress shall execute its proposal power does not mean that
Congress cannot make rules or constrain its Article V powers through reasonable
procedures. That vagueness, or lack of express direction, leaves discretion in
Congress to determine the procedures for how it will exercise its proposal power.

BERNSTEIN & AGEL, supa note 14, at 21.
37.
Id. at 30.
38.
This is not to say that there have not been anomalies and legal challenges to various
amendments. There were many questions with the Civil War Amendments, although no procedural
challenges were litigated. Legal challenges with the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amendments produced
almost the entirety of our Article V procedure jurisprudence. Then, of course, the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment, which many consider a joke, was ratified and affirmed over two hundred years after it
was first proposed. So, the twenty-seven amendments are not exemplars of perfect adherence to the
Article V procedure by any means.
39.
Current congressional rules provide that constitutional amendments go to the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees, but there is no special treatment of the process for proposing a
constitutional amendment. STANDING RULES OF THE Senate, S. DOC. 113-18, r. XXV(2)(m)(4), at
26 (2013) (noting constitutional amendments are referred to the Committee on the judiciary),
https://www.rules.senate.gov/rules-of-the-senate [https://perma.cc/ATH5-QZXR]. The joint
resolution process is not defined other than to treat it like the bill procedure. See RULES OF THE HOUSE
36.

OF REPRESENTATIVES: ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS, H.R. DOC. 115-117, r. X(1)(L)(6),

at 8 (2019) (noting that constitutional amendments are within the jurisdiction of the Committee on the
https://rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/documents/116-House
-Rules-Clerk.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y97W-HWNM].

judiciary),
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But it would be safe to assume that the Senate cannot take up a resolution passed
by the House thirty years earlier and suddenly pass it and send it to the states without
triggering a lawsuit, complaints by House members, or stall tactics by opposing
Senators. 40 Nor can either house be deemed to have approved a proposal on simply
a committee vote. And yet if the Senate did either, would it have violated the text
or the spirit of Article V? When the House voted to approve the Twenty-Second
Amendment by a vote of 81-29, reflecting only about one-quarter of its total
membership, the vote was not challenged. 41
Similarly, Article V does not specify the procedures that state legislatures must
follow in ratifying an amendment proposal. They are left to determine the rules
themselves, and some states have adopted rules that require simple majorities,
others require supermajorities, some require a simple majority of a quorum, and
some require a simple majority of all elected legislators. 42 Again, the process for
ratification is left to the discretion of the states, but one could reasonably assume
that there are some implied constitutional limits to state discretion. Presumably, a
state could not require legislative unanimity, nor could a state permit the governor
or a legislative committee to decide. 43 But even if a state requires a supermajority,
what happens if its legislature ratifies a proposal with only a simple majority? 44 Has
it violated Article V? And who decides if it has violated Article V and on the basis
of what rules, standards, or canons of construction?
This may seem more like the stuff of law school exams than established
constitutional jurisprudence, but these issues have arisen before. For instance, in a

40.
Although it would be against congressional rules to pass bills or resolutions in different
sessions of Congress, each house establishes its own rules and one could, conceivably, change its rules
unilaterally and there 'is not much the other house could do.
41.
KYVIG, supranote 6, at 331.
42.
For instance, Kansas House Rule section 2707 requires a two-thirds majority of all elected
members to ratify a constitutional amendment, as do Colorado's Senate Rules. See LEGIS. COUNCIL,
COLORADO LEGISLATIVE RULES, RSH. PUB. NO. 571, S. r. 26(b), at 76 (1st Sess. 2021); RULES OF
THE KANSAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: 2021-2022 BIENNIUM, H. r. 2707(b), at 32. The Illinois

Constitution, Article XIV section 4, requires a three-fifths vote of all elected members of each house,
as well as an intervening election. Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, and Alabama also require supermajorities
of all elected members. The Illinois Constitution's three-fifths majority was held to be non-binding in
Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ill., 1975), but Illinois's legislature rules also call for a
three-fifths majority vote. Florida has no rules on whether ratification follows regular bill procedures
or resolution procedures, and the Florida Constitution requires an intervening election, which has
been held to be unconstitutional. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 1; Trombetta v. Florida, 353 F. Supp. 575
(M.D. Fla. 1973). Illinois and Florida both have provisions in their constitutions requiring an
intervening election, but they were held to be unconstitutional in Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. at 1309,
and Trombetta, 353 F. Supp. at 578. Seventeen states appear to require a simple majority, the same as is
required for bill passage, while a handful (three) require different majorities between their two houses.
See Dyer, 390 F. Supp. at 1305 n.34. Twenty-four states require a constitutional majority. Id.
43.
This is not so far-fetched, as some states at the founding used executive councils to enact
laws. See Hawke v. Smith, 126 N.E. 400, 404 (Ohio 1919).
44.
As discussed below, this has happened, and the Federal District Court ruled that the
ratification was ineffective because it did not comply with the legislature's supermajority rule. See Dyer,
390 F. Supp. at 1308-09.
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case involving the Illinois ratification of the ERA, Dyer v. Blair,4 5 Judge Stevens
(before he was Justice Stevens) ruled that the Illinois Constitution's mandate of a
supermajority to ratify a constitutional amendment was ineffective but that the
Illinois legislative rules requiring the same supermajority was effective. 46 He
reasoned that the constitutional amendment requiring a two-thirds majority was
irrelevant because it was established by the electorate, which has no Article V
powers, but the legislative rule was effective because the state legislature is the body
granted the sole ratification power.47 He did not render any opinion, however, on
more extreme variations of state legislative discretion, such as whether a legislative
committee could ratify or whether a legislature could require gubernatorial
approval. 48 The Constitution merely requires that states "ratify" a proposal. If state
legislatures get to decide what constitutes ratification, they could presumably
impose all sorts of procedural requirements to make it easier or more difficult
to ratify.
If that seems unlikely, consider that when Idaho ratified the ERA, it did so
with a supermajority pursuant to its legislative rules, but it rescinded with a simple
majority vote. 49 Are ratifications and rescissions different procedures? And when
Kansas ratified the Child Labor Amendment in 1937, the Lieutenant Governor
voted to break a tie in the Kansas Senate. 50 Tennessee ratified the Nineteenth
Amendment in violation of a state constitutional requirement of an intervening
election, and it was alleged that West Virginia violated its own legislative rules when
it ratified the Nineteenth Amendment because a senator had to rush home from a
trip to break a tie vote. 5' Missouri ratified the Nineteenth Amendment arguably in
violation of its constitutional amendment that prohibited its legislature from
ratifying any amendment that would "impair the right of local self-government,
belonging to the people of [the] state." 5 2 And Tennessee ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment by arresting and imprisoning opposing legislators in order to meet the
quorum requirements, even though they were not allowed to vote. 53 It was alleged

45.

Id.

46.
47.

Id.
Id. at 1307.

48.
Numerous ratifications have included gubernatorial approvals, though it is unclear if all
were required by state procedure or it was simply added pro forma. See U.S. GOV'T PUBL'G
OFF., AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1992)
[hereinafter GOVT PUBL'G OFF., AMENDMENTS] https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPOCONAN-1992/pdf/GPO-CONAN-1992-7.pdf [https://perma.cc/MA2E-DDPN].
49.
The fact that Idaho was willing to litigate the issue of the rescissions even though it had
rescinded with less than the required supermajority suggests that this was not so much about testing a
real rescission case, but about the politics of the ERA and expressing the state's frustration with the
impending deadline extension. H.R. Con. Res. 10, 44th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Idaho 1977). See KYVIG, supra
note 6, at 415-16.
50.
See 66 CONG. REC. 3212 (1925).
51.
Leser v. Garnett, 114 A. 840, 841-42 (1921); see also KYVIG, supranote 6, at 248-49.
52.
KYVIG, supranote 6, at 248-49.
53.
Id. at 170.
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in 2015 that the Seventeenth Amendment was not properly ratified because
Wisconsin's ratification was of a text that contained punctuation differences and
omitted a section and because California purportedly never voted at all.54 Although
not so great as to void an amendment, these procedural or substantive
irregularities have been argued by political opponents of certain amendments as
legal grounds for denying the validity of an amendment. The most controversial
amendments-the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Eighteenth, Nineteenth, the Child Labor
Amendment, and the ERA-were challenged in court and their legal legitimacy
called into question by these procedural irregularities. 55 What makes the issue so
confounding, however, is that it is quite unlikely that Congress could impose any
procedural regularity without an amendment to Article V itself since Congress has
no role in the ratification process, arguably even to establish minimum standards. 56
Without such a clear-cut resolution, we find ourselves, like Alice, wandering
through a world in which every path circles back on itself, dead ends appear like
well-traveled thoroughfares, and the White Rabbit dashes by distracting us from
our quest.
We do have a few guideposts, however. We know that states ratifying
amendment proposals are engaging in a federal function defined by Article V and
are not exercising their legislative function as part of their state sovereignty. 57 They
are participants in the constitution-making process as the independent sovereign
states' legal agents and their people who came together to cede a portion of their
power to a national government.58 As independent legal sovereignties that ratified

54.
Brief of Appellant at *2-8, Kidd v. Cascos, No. 03-14-00805-CV, 2015 WL 5001194
(Tex. App. June 29, 2015). The court held both of these objections to be meritless. Kidd, 2015 WL
9436655, at *3-4.
55.
Kidd, 2015 WL 9436655(; Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920); Dillon v. Gloss, 256
U.S. 368 (1921); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922); Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1303
(N.D. Ill. 1975); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); Chandler v. Wise, 307 U.S. 474 (1939).
56.
There is serious question as to Congress's authority to legislate matters of detail regarding
the Article V process. In 1869, a resolution was introduced to require that state legislatures discuss
proposed constitutional amendments on the sixth day of their next legislative session and continue to
discuss it until a final decision is made. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong. 1st Sess. 75, 102, 334 (1869); see also
Edward S. Corwin & Mary Louise Ramsey, The ConstitutionalLaw of ConstitutionalAmendment, 26
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 185, 208 (1951) ("Whether such a measure is within the power of Congress
incident to the power of submission of amendments is doubtful."). The consensus was that such a
requirement would be unconstitutional. Id.; see also LESTER BERNHARDT ORFIELD, THE AMENDING
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 64-65 (1942). Since the states may not require popular referenda
on proposed amendments, it is equally likely that Congress may not do so. The fact that Congress may
not legislate the terms and conditions of state ratifications in ways that clearly contradict Article V
suggests that Congress may not legislate the terms and conditions at all. For that reason, 1
U.S.C. § 106(b) has been the only legislation Congress has passed regarding the Article V process, and
any more substantive legislation would seem to raise serious constitutional questions.
57.
Numerous courts have noted that ratification is a federal function authorized under the
Constitution and is not part of the states' independent sovereign power. See Leser, 258 U.S. at 137; Dyer,
390 F. Supp. at 1303.
58.
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheaton) 316, 402-05 (1819).
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the Constitution in the first place, the states had sole independent power to bind
themselves and to cede their power to be governed by a constitution. 59 When they
ratified the Constitution, they were acting as independent sovereignties. But when
they amend, they are acting under the authority of Article V. Yet Article V treats
them as the independent sovereignties they were in 1787. So is their ability to make
rules on how to ratify a part of their retained sovereign powers or a power returned
to them and constrained by Article V?60 Where that power lies could have an impact
on who determines whether they have acted within their constitutional bounds
when they ratify or rescind.
The Supreme Court has held that the President has no role in the amending
process, 6 1 which would possibly exclude the power of the Archivist, an executive
branch official, or the Department ofjJustice, to provide binding determinations of
the legal sufficiency of the ERA ratifications. Nor can the entire state electorate
have Article V powers to ratify. 62 The Court established that the Framers meant
"legislature" in its commonsense meaning in Article V and thus did not grant the
electorate the power to validate a legislature's ratification by popular referendum. 63
Nor can a state, by legislative rule or a constitutional amendment, require an
intervening election of its state legislature before that body may ratify a proposed
amendment. 64 But what if a state decided that its legislature would consist of every
person who was bom on July 4th? Would that body constitute a legislature for
purposes of Article V? Of course, there might be Guarantee Clause issues here that
get us out of that dead end,65 yet Article V still does not specify what is meant by a
legislature nor does it specify what the act of ratification means or how it is done.
Perhaps, as with congressional rules on joint resolutions, we can safely assume that
the popularly elected body that engages in the lawmaking function of the state is the

59.

Id.; see also Andrew GI. Kilberg, Note, We the People: The Original Meaning of Popular

Sovereignty, 100 VA. L. REV. 1061 (2014).
60.
An interesting diversion to further complicate the issue is whether a state that permits
constitutional ratification by referenda, or legislation by referenda, could see the population insisting
that the legislature ratify or demanding that the legislature not ratify. Vikram David Amar discusses the
role of the people in the Article V amendment process in The People Made Me Do It: Can the People of

the States Instruct and Coerce Their State Legislaturesin the Article V ConstitutionalAmendment Process?,
41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1037 (2000).
61.
Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dallas) 378, 381 n.* (1798).
62.
See general4y Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
Id. at 231.
63.
64.
Trombetta v. Florida, 353 F. Supp. 575 (M.D. Fla. 1973); Walker v. Dunn, 498 S.W.2d 102
(Tenn. 1972).
65.
Obviously, ratification means to affirm a proposal, but whether a lieutenant governor can
break a tie in a state senate in order to reach a majority vote or whether a governor can veto a state's
rescission is unsettled. The Kansas Supreme Court said yes in Coleman v. Miller, 71 P.2d 518, 527
(Kan. 1937), but the United States Supreme Court failed to reach an opinion on that issue in Coleman
v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 447 (1939). And Governor Ward of New Jersey vetoed its rescission of the
Fourteenth Amendment but there was no judicial pronouncement on the appropriateness of that veto.
See KYVIG, supra note 6 at 174.
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legislature and that if it votes by at least a majority vote in favor of approving an
amendment proposal, then Article V has been satisfied. Frankly, if a state legislature
consisted of everyone born on July 4th, we would probably have far more of a
constitutional crisis than just the Article V irregularities posed here.
Yet even with our basic guideposts, the rabbit hole continues on its winding
path. If the Constitution allows a state to set its own legislative rules on ratification,
what if it chose to violate its own rules? Would it have violated only a state legislative
rule, or would the state have also violated Article V? Would it only violate Article V
in certain circumstances? For instance, it would seem logical that if state legislative
rules call for a supermajority vote to ratify a constitutional amendment, but the
legislature ratifies with only a simple majority, it has violated state law but not Article
V.66 But if it ratifies with less than a majority at all, then it violates both. Can a state
violate its own laws but not Article V when it engages in the constitutionally defined
ratification function? Presumably, there is no reason why it might not if Article V
allows states to set their own rules for ratification. So that leaves us in the sticky
situation in which the question of whether states have properly exercised their
Article V ratification function is a matter of federal constitutional law but the
Constitution grants to the states broad discretion in how they exercise that function.
Does that make Article V ratification questions matters of state law? And if a state
chooses to impose a supermajority requirement on ratification and violates that law,
has it violated the U.S. Constitution or state law or both or neither? Finally, who is
going to tell us whether it has or not?
This indeterminacy in both the proposal and the ratification functions are
first-level problems. What happens when we get to second-level issues, such as
Congress imposing a limitation on the states' ratification function through its
proposal power? If Congress issues a proposed amendment with a section requiring
that states ratify the proposal with supermajorities, that they ratify within three years,
that they must get the govemor's signature, or that they must hold a popular vote,
has Congress used its proposal power to invade the ratification power of the
states? 67 It would seem the answer is clearly yes. Both the procedure for ratification
as well as the determination whether to ratify are granted solely to the states. Using
the proposal function, or the mode of ratification function, to influence or control
how the states ratify would be unseemly. 68 Congress telling the states they must have

66.
Although Judge Stevens affirmed the Illinois legislative rule requiring a super-majority, he
did not venture to discuss whether the simple majority ratification satisfied Article V, and should
therefore bind the state, in Dyer v. Blair. 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1305 n.35 (1975).
67.
These issues have been discussed and attempts to impose congressional limits, like an
intervening election, have failed. See discussion infra notes 243, 303-06.
68.
Senator Cummins commented on the deadline added to the Eighteenth Amendment as
follows: "[The deadline amendment] is not only an exercise of authority which has not been granted
to us by the Constitution, but it is exceedingly unfair and unjust .... Our authority is exhausted when
we declare that an amendment shall be proposed to the States." 55 CONG. REC. 5652 (1917) (statement
of Sen. Cummins).
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a supermajority or they must ratify within a specified time would seem to infringe
on the states' function to determine whether or not to ratify, even if it were located
in a proposal issued under Congress's legitimate Article V proposal power. If a
majority would ratify but a supermajority would not, and state law permits only a
simple majority, then how can Congress impose a different standard? If states have
the power to determine whether to ratify, then how can Congress impose a limit on
when they can make that determination?69 Both seem to be an infringement of the
states' sole ratification power through an illegitimate expansion of Congress's
proposal power. And what would happen if Congress or the Archivist were to
accept Illinois's 1972 ratification of the ERA by a simple majority when its
legislative rules call for a supermajority or were to deny ratification by a simple
majority because Congress had required a supermajority? Only a ratified
constitutional amendment to Article V detailing the ratification procedure would
seem consistent with Article V. 70
To add just one more teensy-weensy twist in our procedural path, there might
be a difference if Congress imposes a ratification restriction in the text of the
amendment proposal itself rather than in the mode of ratification. 7 1 For instance,
when the first deadline was proposed in the Senate deliberations on the Eighteenth
Amendment, Senator Warren Harding suggested a third section to the proposal,
adding what eventually became a seven-year deadline on the states to ratify. 72
Senator Brandegee of Connecticut strongly opposed the deadline, explaining:
[I]t is utterly beyond my mental apparatus to comprehend the claim that,
with the Constitution as at present written, with its existing machinery for
its own amendment, a proposed amendment which it is sought to make a
part of the Constitution can include a provision which will so change the
Constitution as to make it applicable to the very amendment which itself
can not take effect until it has been ratified by three-quarters of the States.
It is an attempt to hoist yourself by your own boot straps, if I may use a
homely phrase. 73

69.
It is actually a matter of Congress limiting the right of states to change their minds and ratify
after rejecting, or after taking no action, which is a right under Article V recognized in Coleman v. Miller.
307 U.S. at 472-73. States have a constitutionally recognized right to change their minds and ratify after
rejecting, and a deadline certainly precludes them from doing so unless they do it within the short
timeframe given. Id.
70.
See Hanlon, supra note 15, at 684-85.
71.
Four amendments (Eighteenth, Twentieth, Twenty-First, and Twenty-Second) contained
deadlines in the text of the amendments themselves, while four later amendments (Twenty-Third,
Twenty-Fourth, Twenty-Fifth, and Twenty-Sixth) contain the deadline in the preamble, or resolving
clause. See U.S. CONST. amends. XVIII, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXV, XVI.
72.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 3 ("This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in the
Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.")
The Twentieth, Twenty-First, and Twenty-Second Amendments contain identical language. See
U.S. CONST. amends. XX, § 6, XXI, § 3, XXII, § 2.
73.
55 CONG. REC. 5651 (1917) (statement of Sen. Brandegee).
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In other words, the deadline could not be an effective limit on the states until
the proposed amendment had been ratified, at which point the deadline would be
irrelevant and inoperative. Only if the states ratified the amendment after the
deadline would the restriction be potentially operative. And either the proposed
amendment would have self-destructed as a result of the deadline even though
the amendment and its deadline was not fully ratified or, more logically, the deadline
could not operate to kill the amendment until after it was ratified beyond the
deadline. And for that to happen, the late ratifications must have been effective
in order to animate the proposed amendment, only to have the suddenly effective
deadline snuff it out. But if the ratifications after the deadline were never effective,
then the deadline never becomes operative. Only if the ratifications were operative,
in violation of the deadline, could they breathe life into the deadline that would
consequently render them inoperative. Like the riddle that says on one side of a
piece of paper, "The statement on the other side of this paper is true," and
on the other side says, "The statement on the other side of this paper is false,"
deadlines in the proposal that would void a tardy ratification would fit right into
Alice's Wonderland.74
Further puzzles appear when we consider the role of popular opinion in
amendment ratification. The Court has held that legislative ratification is not
subject to a subsequent popular referendum. 75 But what about advisory referenda,
either before or after the legislative vote? This issue came up repeatedly in state
courts as people signed petitions to bring amendment proposals to the public,
especially in the case of Prohibition, after their state legislatures voted to ratify. 76
The states split on the issue, but the Supreme Court's decision in Hawke v. Smith
settled most of these questions. Questions of popular opinion and advisory
referenda also arose in the case of the ERA,77 but litigation on those issues was
arguably unripe. Nonetheless, what if a state, like California, has a provision for
popular instigation of legislation and the state votes to order its legislature to ratify,
or not to ratify, a proposed amendment? 78 Could the electorate pass a state

74.
Deadlines and other limits exercised pursuant to the mode of ratification may be logically
distinguished because the mode of ratification is established in a preamble that identifies whether the
proposed amendment shall be ratified by state legislatures or state conventions. The preamble is not
part of the amendment being ratified and does not become operative once the proposed amendment
has been ratified by the requisite number of states. Nonetheless, it would seem especially problematic
for a preamble that has no legally binding authority other than to specify the mode of ratification to
void state ratifications undertaken pursuant to the states' sole ratification power. For more on this, see
Wright, supra note 13, at 55-58.
75.
Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
76.
Prior v. Noland, 188 P. 729 (Colo. 1920); Barlotty v. Lyons, 189 P. 282 (Cal. 1920); Decher
v. Vaughan, 177 N.W. 388 (Mich. 1920); Carson v. Sullivan, 223 S.W. 571 (Mont. 1920); State ex
rel. Gill v. Morris, 191 P. 364 (Okla. 1920); State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, 181 P. 920 (Wash. 1920).
77.
Askew v. Meier, 231 N.W.2d 821 (N.D. 1975); Kimble v. Swackhamer, 584 P.2d 161
(Nev. 1978).
78.
See generally Amar, supra note 60.
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constitutional amendment mandating the legislature ratify the ERA? These are not
entirely far-fetched ideas, as Professor Amar discusses in his work.79
But before we tie ourselves up in logistical knots that even Houdini could not
escape, we must remember that past procedural irregularities have been sidestepped
or ignored, yet we have not found ourselves floundering on a constitutional
seashore like a walrus out of water. But the Court's kicking the can down the road,
just to add another random metaphor here, does not provide much comfort as we
experience the constitutional crises of the Trump era, the politicized Department
of Justice, and a Supreme Court willing to overturn well-established precedent.80
The ERA directly presents some of the most important unanswered questions about
Article V procedure at a moment in time when clarity is most needed and least likely
to be obtained. In the case of the ERA, we are not dealing with the extreme
examples of legislative committees ratifying a proposed amendment or Congress
imposing a particular ratification requirement in the text of the amendment itself.
Instead, we are dealing with state ratifications after a congressional deadline located
in the preamble and rescissions after states have ratified and submitted their
certificates of ratification to the Archivist. And although there are some
simple-majority/supermajority issues raised in the rescissions, and a gubernatorial
veto, we are not in the hinterlands of potential constitutional irregularities.
To keep from disappearing down the many dark side paths of our Article V
perambulations, let's assume that Article V grants the states a certain amount of
discretion to establish their own procedures for amendment ratifications. Let's also
assume that certain processes may be beyond the range of Article V, and that those
might include congressional deadlines and gubernatorial approval but not the
simple-majority/supermajority divide. And we can reasonably analogize to the
legislative process, so that congressional proposals, like a statute, must occur in the
same session of Congress. 8 ' Further, state ratifications, like the Presidential
signature or veto, are a reasonably defined act of their legislatures that follow
standard law-making norms. But that leaves us still with the terribly important
unanswered question of who decides when a state's ratification (be it a late one or
one followed by a rescission) is legally sufficient under Article V. That power could
lie with Congress as the national political body that is responsible for the political
and policy decisions that underlie constitutional amendments and the structure of
our republic. After all, the Supreme Court has held that Guarantee Clause issues are
nonjusticiable political questions and, on the same reasoning, could rule that Article

79.

Id.

80.
See, e.g., Neal Devins, State Constitutionalismin the Age of Party Polarization,71 RUTGERS
U. L. REV. 1129 (2019); RICHARD H. FALLON,JR., 'LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT
(2018). These are just two of the more academic treatments of the current crisis in constitutionalism.
81.
Michael Stokes Paulsen would adopt a legislative model analogy for Article V. See Paulsen,
supra note 18, at 721-33.
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V issues are political questions. 82 It could lie with the federal courts as the bodies
responsible for interpreting the Federal Constitution. Justice Marshall's epic phrase
that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is"83 provides direct support for judicial review of Article V issues. It
could lie with the state legislatures as the principal agents in the constitution-making
process and the legally binding agent of independent sovereignties. 84 Or, it could lie
with the state courts as the entities that ensure compliance with state law and have
constitutional authority to limit the state's independent sovereignty. 85
There are valid arguments for all of these options, although scholars who have
studied this subject generally agree that the federal courts are the most logical choice
because they are not participants in the Article V process so they would not be guilty
of aggrandizing themselves, as could be expected of Congress and the state
legislatures. 86 But, as we learned in Bush v. Gore, the courts can and do participate
in functions, like electing a president, to which they are not constitutional parties.8 7
At the end of the day, the importance of constitution-making supports the
conclusion that federal and not independent state courts should provide guidance,
continuity, and a commitment to a uniform federal structure. For, as Judge Stevens
stated in Dyer, "We are persuaded that the word 'ratification' as used in article V of
the federal Constitution must be interpreted with the kind of consistency that is
characteristic of judicial, as opposed to political, decision making." 88
Unlike Alice, who simply wakes up and finds herself back in her normal world,
we cannot wake up to find the ERA puzzles have vanished. Even if they
did, they would still exist for another amendment on another day. Therefore,
to escape our rabbit hole, it makes sense to use the kind of navigation
tools-original understandings, canons of construction, prior practices, and judicial
precedent-that courts commonly use to construe the many ambiguities of our
Constitution.

82.
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 Howard) 1, 56 (1849); Ryan C. Williams, The "Guarantee"
Clause, 132 HARV. L. REV. 602, 679 (2018). But some critics disagree with the nonjusticiability of
Guarantee Clause disputes. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should be
Justiciable,65 U. COLO. L. REV. 849 (1994).
83.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
84.
If the state legislatures have the unlimited power to ratify, then their certificates of
ratification should be, as they are, deemed conclusive.
85.
See generaly Hon. Chase T. Rogers, Putting Meat on ConstitutionalBones: The Aythority of
State Courts to Craft Prophylactic Rules Under the Federal Constitution, 98 B.U. L. REv. 541 (2018);
Lawrence Friedman, The ConstitutionalValue of Dialogue and the New JudicialFederalism,28 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 93 (2000); Jason Mazzone, The Bill of Rghts in the Eary State Courts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2007).
86.
See sources cited infra note 204.
87.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
88.
Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1303 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
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B. Escapingthe Rabbit Hole
We cannot really be surprised that Article V provides little guidance to these
technical questions when the rest of the Constitution is equally enigmatic. But
before we turn to those tools, let's be clear on the specific ERA questions that we
seek to have answered. First, we want to know if Congress can impose a deadline
on the states for ratifying. That means we want to know if ratifications after that
date are valid (because Congress lacks the power to restrict the states' ratification
function) or are invalid (because Congress may set conditions on states ratifying,
either through its proposal power or its mode of ratification power). 89 This is a
federalism question about the balance of power between the states and Congress.
We also need to know if the Archivist may rely on the executive branch opinion,
which, like that of the hookah-smoking caterpillar, is advice that comes from an
official with no Article V authority. There is no role for the executive branch in the
Article V process, so to imagine that the OLC can provide binding guidance to the
Archivist is certainly problematic. 90 And if it is not binding and only advisory, then
who judges whether the OLC's advice is accurate or not? Some states have alleged
that the deadline is an unconstitutional usurpation of the states' sole ratification
power and a violation of the federalism balance guaranteed by the Tenth
Amendment. 91 Surely neither the states nor Congress should have the sole power
to resolve that dispute, as they are parties to the transaction. That leaves the
federal courts.
Second, we need to know if states may rescind their ratifications after
submitting certificates of ratification to the Archivist. If the Archivist is going to

89.
The answer to this question may implicate further questions, such as whether Congress can
extend or waive a deadline once given, whether in the text of the proposal or in the preamble. This was
a big issue with the ERA extension debates, even after Congress voted by a simple majority to add three
years and three months to the deadline. See, e.g., Held, Herndon & Stager, supra note 15; Witter, supra
note 17; Ginsburg, supra note 17; Rees, supra note 17; Hatch, supra note 17; Baker, supra note 18;
Comment, The EqualRights Amendment andArticle V: A Frame orkforAnaysis of the Extension and
Rescission Issues, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 494 (1978).
90.
When federal officers have legal questions as to their assigned roles and functions, they may
submit those questions to the Attorney General. 28 U.S.C. § 511 provides: "The Attorney General shall
give his advice and opinion on questions of law when required by the President." It makes sense that
the Archivist may solicit a legal opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel, which was done in this case
and in the case of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment. Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment,
supra note 8; Congressional Pay Amendment, supranote 34. However, OLC opinions cannot be legally
determinative for multiple reasons. The Executive has no apparent role in the Article V process. Only
Congress and the states are expressly granted power to effectuate amendments to the Constitution. U.S.
CONST. art. V. The Supreme Court has held that the President has no role in that process.
Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dallas) 378, 381 n.* (1798). If the opinion of the OLC were
binding, that would impermissibly interject the Executive branch into the amendment process. If an
OLC opinion could be determinative, the President could essentially subvert the will of Congress, the
States, and the people.
91.
Petitioners unsuccessfully made this argument in Dillon v. Gloss, but states have made the
argument again in the ERA litigation in the District Court for the District of Columbia. See Complaint,
Virginia v. Ferriero, 525 F. Supp. 3d 36 (D.D.C. 2021) (No.1:20-cv-00242).
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publish the ERA, then he needs to know if the rescissions are valid. Again, does he
look to the Department of Justice? Can Congress make that call? The Supreme
Court has held that amendments become effective immediately upon ratification by
the last state and publication is a ministerial duty only.9 2 If the courts determine that
the rescissions are ineffective, then the Twenty-Eighth Amendment became a part
of the Constitution on January 27, 2020, and the two-year window to implement it
is gradually closing. 93 The Court has also stated that ratification certificates are
conclusive on the Archivist despite allegations of legal insufficiencies. 94 The
Archivist has received thirty-eight ratifications, and yet he has not published the
ERA. Has he breached his statutory duty? Can Congress impose anything more
than statutory duties of publication on the Archivist if Article V is self-executing?
But if it is self-executing, what happens if a state's ratification is legitimately called
into question? Who decides if the ratification certificate complies with Article V or
state law: Congress, the state courts, the federal courts, the Archivist, state
legislatures, the Department of Justice? There seem to be too many forks in our
Article V road, but most are dead ends.
II. THE WHITE RABBIT OR THE CHESHIRE CAT: WHOSE ADVICE SHOULD
WE FOLLOW?

In Alice's efforts to make her way through Wonderland, numerous characters
give her direction and advice, but to whom should she listen? The Caterpillar tells
her that one side of the mushroom makes her grow and the other makes her shrink.
The Cheshire Cat tells her the way to the March Hare's house. The White Rabbit
keeps running by apparently with some knowledge of where the different roads lead.
If we know who to follow in our Article V wonderland, we can eventually return to
stable ground. As noted earlier, these choices are the federal courts, the state courts,
Congress, or the state legislatures. Let us take a few minutes to consider the merits
of each, remembering that Article V does not provide an answer, nor do Articles I
or III.
A. State Legislatures
Because Article V grants the sole ratification function to state legislatures, we
could rationally leave the decision about the legal sufficiency of state ratifications
to the legislatures that enact them, assuming we can feel confident as to what body

92. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 376-77 (1921); U.S. v. Sitka, 845 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1988);
U.S. v. Stahl, 792 F.2d 1438, 1441 (9th Cir. 1986).
93.

Section 3 of the ERA provides that "[t]his amendment shall take effect two years after the

date of ratification." Equal Rights Amendment of 1972, H.R.J. Res., 92 Cong, 86 Stat. 1523 § 3.
94. Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922); see U.S. v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931);
Chandler v. Wise, 307 U.S. 474, 477-78 (1939).
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makes up the legislature. 95 The states apparently take their role in the process
seriously, and legislatures have adopted rules that seem reasonably designed to
execute that function. Although there is some deviation among states, there does
not appear to be widespread differences. And there is little likelihood that
legislatures will engage in some of the shenanigans discussed earlier, like allowing
ratification by a legislative committee. Unfortunately, however, state legislatures are
not monolithic entities, and there have been internal disagreements and some
irregularities in their own procedures.
The most irregular procedure was Tennessee's ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment where opposing members were held under house arrest and counted
as present even though they did not respond to the roll call or vote. 96 But that was
an extraordinary time as most southern states were under military governments.
Missouri failed to ratify section Two of the Fifteenth Amendment the first time
around, but re-ratified to correct the situation. 97 Governors have approved
ratifications apparently without authority from Article V, as in the Eighteenth and
Nineteenth Amendments. 98 But when it comes to the serious job of ratification,
state legislatures appear to have complied with basic norms of legislative approval,
whether they have adopted supermajority requirements or not.
Yet when a legislature is deeply divided over controversial proposals, as with
the Nineteenth, the ERA, and the Child Labor Amendments, differences among
members of state legislatures have led to litigation and allegations of procedural
improprieties. Where states voted to ratify after previously voting to reject,
opposing members brought suit in Kansas and Kentucky, and those state courts
split on whether the legislatures could legally vote again after initially rejecting the
proposal. 99 The Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that the legislature could not pick
up the proposal again, and the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that it could.

95.
In Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920), the Court defined the legislative body for Article
V purposes as follows:
A Legislature was then the representative body which made the laws of the
people .... There can be no question that the framers of the Constitution clearly
understood and carefully used the terms in which that instrument referred to the action of
the legislatures of the States . . . . It is true that the power to legislate in the enactment of the
laws of a State is derived from the people of the State. But the power to ratify a proposed
amendment to the Federal Constitution has its source in the Federal Constitution. The act
of ratification by the State derives its authority from the Federal Constitution to which the
State and its people have alike assented . ... This view of the amendment is confirmed in
the history of its adoption found in 2 Watson on the Constitution, 1301 et seq. Any other
view might lead to endless confusion in the manner of ratification of federal amendments.
The choice of means of ratification was wisely withheld from conflicting action in the
several States.
Id. at 228-30.
96.
KYVIG, supranote 6, at 170.
97.
GOV'T PUBL'G OFF., AMENDMENTS, sufra note 48, at 7.
98.
Id. at 35 nn.10-11.
99.
See Wise v. Chandler, 108 S.W.2d 1024, 1028 (Ky. 1937); Coleman v. Miller, 71 P.2d 518,
526 (Kan. 1937).
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Importantly, both state courts and the U.S. Supreme Court held that disgruntled
members of state legislatures have standing to challenge legislative ratification
actions for compliance with Article V requirements.1 00 However, when Illinois
legislators challenged its ERA ratification, in Dyer v. Blair, the federal district court
held that a rule requiring a legislative supermajority was binding to support the
state's refusal to transmit a certificate of ratification to Washington but that the
courts would not consider challenges to certificates once transmitted.101 And that's
the rub.
In Dyer, Judge Stevens explored the different possibilities of how Article V
could be interpreted in light of state ratification procedures, positing that states
could adopt a variety of different rules on majorities, supermajorities, and
definitions of a quorum.10 2 In reconciling the variety of state rules with the lack of
direction in Article V, Judge Stevens concluded:
We may take it as decided, therefore, that an extraordinary majority is not
requiredby federal law. There is, moreover, some evidence that when article
V was drafted the framers assumed that state legislatures would act by
majority vote. That evidence, like the text of article V itself, is equally
consistent with the view that a majority of a quorum would be sufficient,
or with a view that a majority of the elected legislators would be required.
And, of course, it is also consistent with the view that the framers did not
intend to impose either of those altematives upon the state legislators, but,
instead, intended to leave that choice to the ratifying assemblies.
This last view seems most plausible to us. If the framers had intended to
require the state legislatures to act by simple majority, we think they would
have said so explicitly. When the Constitution requires action to be taken
by an extraordinary majority, that requirement is plainly stated. While the
omission of a comparable requirement in connection with ratification
makes it quite clear that a bare majority is permissible, it does not
necessarily indicate that either a simple majority or a constitutional majority
must be accepted as necessary. We think the omission more reasonably
indicates that the framers intended to treat the determination of the vote
required to pass a ratifying resolution as an aspect of the process that each
state legislature, or state convention, may specify for itself'1 03
Going further, he concluded:
Article V identifies the body-either a legislature or a convention-which
must ratify a proposed amendment. The act of ratification is an expression
of consent to the amendment by that body. By what means that body shall
decide to consent or not to consent is a matter for that body to determine

100. Chandler, 108 S.W.2d at 1033-34; Chandler v. Wise, 307 U.S. 474, 477 (1939); Coleman,
71 P.2d at 526; Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 439 (1939).
101. 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1307-08 n.40 (N.D. II1. 1975).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1305-06.
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for itself This conclusion is not inconsistent with the premise that the
definition of the term 'ratified' is a matter of federal law. The term merely
requires that the decision to consent or not to consent to a proposed
amendment be made by each legislature, or by each convention, in
accordance with procedures which each such body shall prescribe.1 04
But this conclusion begs the question: Can the legislature choose to permit
ratifications by legislative committee or by less than a majority of those voting on
the proposal? Could the legislature require unanimity? Does violation of the state
legislature's rule violate Article V? To hold that Article V does not require a
particular procedure is not the same as saying that any procedure the state comes
up with is permissible. And we clearly know this because popular referenda and
requirements of intervening elections have been held to violate Article V.1 05
But, just when one might have thought there was some stable ground here,

Judge Stevens dropped a curious footnote to throw it all into disarray again. He
stated:
This is not to suggest that we would entertain a cause of action attacking a
state ratification certification on the grounds that the legislature had failed
to comply with its own procedures. As the Court stated in Leser
v. Gamett, . .. official notice to the Secretary, duly authenticated, that they
had [ratified] was conclusive upon him, and, being certified to by his
proclamation, is conclusive upon the courts. 106
Our legislative path just hit a detour. Thus, states may establish their own
procedures, and the federal courts will not review challenges alleging the state did
not follow its own procedure so long as someone manages to get that certificate of
ratification submitted to the Secretary of State or, today, the Archivist, before a legal
challenge hits the courthouse.
This conclusion is profoundly troubling, especially in light of Tennessee's
arrest of dissenting legislators and holding them under house arrest in order to reach
a quorum, even though the body did not allow them to vote on the proposed
Fourteenth Amendment.1 07 It is troubling in light of the participation of executive
officials in breaking ties or approving ratifications,1 08 vetoing rescissions,1 09 and
legislatures violating their own requirements of an intervening election or a

104.
Id. at 1307.
105.
See generaly Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922);
Trombetta v. Florida, 353 F. Supp. 575 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
106.
Dyer, 390 F. Supp. at 1307 n.40.
107.
KYVIG, supranote 6, at 170.
108.
Governors approved legislative ratifications numerous times: Eighteenth Amendment
(North Dakota and Louisiana governors approved); Nineteenth Amendment (Iowa, New Hampshire,
Montana, Colorado, and New Mexico governors approved). See GOV'T PUBL'G OFF., AMENDMENTS,
supra note 48, at 35 n.10-11.
109.
Governor Ward of New Jersey vetoed its rescission of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
Governor Stovall of Kentucky vetoed its rescission of the ERA. See id. at 30 n.6.
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supermajority.11 0 Even though intervening elections have been held to be an
unconstitutional limitation on the states, the willingness of state legislatures to
forego compliance with their own rules, or with state constitutional constraints,
should give us pause. The propensity of state legislatures to withdraw their
ratifications is also problematic if they believe they are acting in legally binding ways.
Usually states rescind their ratifications when a subsequent election brings a new
political majority to the state house and they feel it is important to go on the record
with their disagreement about the state's earlier position on a particular amendment.
But because rescissions have always been deemed ineffective, the political posturing
of such votes, while understandable, emphasizes the political character of the Article
V amendment process. And of course, the fact that legislatures can reverse course
and ratify after having rejected, and that political partisanship is permissible in this
way but not the other way around, can leave hard feelings and a sense of unfairness
that can lead to litigation. That was the case with Idaho's rescission of the ERA.111
The ability of state legislatures to change their minds simply highlights the political
stakes of amendment ratifications, leaning into the political question solution. And
yet, constitutional litigation is also a profoundly political process.
Idaho ratified the ERA in March 1972, within days of it being sent to the
states. But as opposition ramped up against the amendment, Idaho rescinded five
years later, in February 1977.112 While Idaho had ratified with a supermajority as
required by its legislative rules, it rescinded with only a simple majority.11 3 South
Dakota, frustrated with the congressional deadline extension for the ERA, voted
years after its unequivocal ratification to impose a deadline on its own prior act,
effectively sunsetting the earlier ratification as of the date of the original deadline.114
In the case of Idaho, the legislature apparently violated its own house rules to
rescind with a simple majority and, in the case of South Dakota, the legislature acted
to condition its ratification, after the fact, in contravention of Madison's clear
stricture that conditional ratifications were unacceptable.11 5 The willingness of
Idaho legislators to litigate the validity of its rescission and the willingness of South
Dakota to stand by its rescission even forty years later as additional states have
ratified the ERA1"6 suggest that politics can not only guide the decision of whether
or not to ratify but can also guide decisions about violating legislative rules or norms

110.
See Trombetta, 353 F. Supp. at 575.
111.
See Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107 (D. Idaho 1981).
112.
Betsy Z. Russell, Eye on Boise: Idaho's Role in the ERA Ratification Saga, IDAHO PRESS
(Dec. 14, 2019), https://www.idahopress.com/news/local/eye-on-boise-idaho-s-role-in-the-eraratification/ article_445ead8f-d810-5933-9aca-929acdbe36b1.html [https://perma.cc/Q6WY-FFG4].
113.
H. Con. Res. 10, 44th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 1977).
114.
S.J. Res. 2, 96th Cong., 125 CONG. REC. 4861 (1979).
115.
See discussion of conditional ratifications infra at note 316 and accompanying text.
116.
South Dakota joined Alabama and Louisiana in a suit in the Northern District of Alabama
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Archivist to return its certificate of ratification and
refuse to record Illinois, Nevada, and Virginia's (if the latter ratified). See Complaint, Alabama
v. Ferriero, No. 7:19-cv-02032-LSC, 2019 WL 6894418 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 16, 2019).
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that amendment opponents believe are interfering with their own political agendas.
And with severe gerrymandering in many states, the notion that state legislatures
not only have unchecked authority to set their own rules for Article V ratification
but can violate those rules with impunity is troubling at the very least.
There is some limited precedent for the conclusion that state legislatures have
free rein to set the terms and procedures of the ratification function granted to them
by Article V.11 7 But it is problematic that the courts will uphold a legislature's refusal
to submit a certificate of ratification when the legislature violated its own rules but
will not invalidate a ratification certificate that was submitted even when there is
clear evidence that the state failed to follow its own procedure or potentially failed
to follow the threshold norms of Article V.11 8 If anything, the courts should do the
opposite. If a legislature fails to submit a certificate of ratification that its members
feel should be sent, even if the state's ratification vote purportedly violated its own
procedures, the remedy would be mandamus issuing from the state courts that have
jurisdiction over the official responsible for submitting the certificate of
ratification. On the other hand, if a legislature submits a certificate of ratification
purportedly in violation of its own procedures or Article V norms, the federal courts
should be concerned because that action potentially disrupts and discredits the
amendment process and jeopardizes the ratifications of other states. Thus, while
Judge Stevens may have correctly determined that the Illinois ratification of the
ERA by a simple majority, in violation of its own legislature rule requiring a
supermajority, was ineffective, there was no need to impose the federal courts in a
matter of state house procedure. But if Illinois were to submit a ratification
certificate that was based on a vote of a legislative committee only, a gubernatorial
order, or a vote in violation of its legislative rules, arguably the courts should not
defer and refuse to review the case. Nonetheless, Judge Stevens asserted that this is
precisely what the courts may not do.1"9
It would seem that so long as state legislative infighting results in a stalemate,
politics and perhaps a state court ruling for mandamus or prohibition is the
appropriate path forward. But where a state has submitted a purportedly improper
certificate of ratification to Washington and other states might rely on that
ratification, the national interest would militate in favor of federal judicial review in
order to maintain and protect the national standard that, albeit in its less than clear
form, undergirds the Article V process. I am not sure that we can take comfort in
the fact that every time a state's ratification has been challenged it has been upheld,

117.
Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1307 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130,
137 (1922).
118.
In Leser v. Garnett, Tennessee violated its arguably unconstitutional requirement of an
intervening election, as discussed more fully in Trombetta v. Florida. 258 U.S. 130 (1922); 353
F. Supp. 575, 577-78 (M.D. Fla. 1973). Tennessee finally struck down its impermissible requirement
in Valker v. Dunn, 498 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tenn. 1972).
119.
Dyer, 390 F. Supp. at 1309.
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even if it might have been stricken by a lower court. 120 At this point in our Article
V jurisprudence, so long as the body that is plausibly the state legislature engages in
some semblance of a ratification function and certifies that decision to Washington,
judicial review seems to be foreclosed.
B. State Courts
It makes sense that state courts would have some limited jurisdiction to
determine if a state legislature has followed its own procedures in ratifying an
amendment proposal. However, prior precedent suggests that state courts are
ill-suited to the task. They can certainly evaluate whether a legislature has followed
its own legislatively enacted rule for ratification.121 And certainly state courts can
and do evaluate whether state actions conform to federal constitutional mandates.
But on the latter question, it seems to me that state court decisions must
be reviewable by federal courts in conformity with the Supremacy Clause
and Article 111.122
Although a handful of cases, including some that made it to the Supreme
Court, were decided originally in the state courts, their record when it comes to
interpreting Article V is mixed at best. Of the three state supreme court decisions
on Article V procedures that were appealed to the Supreme Court, the state courts
were reversed in two and the third was affirmed on different grounds. In Hawke
v. Smith, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed lower court decisions that the term
"legislature" in Article V could encompass the Ohio public referendum, which was
recently added to the state constitution for ratifying federal constitutional
amendments.1 23 The most compelling argument to the Ohio justices of the Hawke
court was that it had recently held that the term "legislature" in Article I, Section 4
of the Constitution could encompass public referenda in setting the time, place, and
manner of electing senators, and the U.S. Supreme Court had affirmed that broad
meaning of "legislature."1 24 How, they argued, could "legislature" mean something
different for purposes of Article I, Section 4 and Article V? But the brief, formalistic
dissent by Justice Robinson in Hildebrandtprevailed when the Article V case came
up to the Supreme Court. He argued that the founders understood legislatures to
be the legislative bodies only and not to encompass newfangled institutions and
mechanisms to express public sentiment and that the "judgment [affirming a public

120. See generalyLeser, 258 U.S. 130; Chandler v. Wise, 307 U.S. 474 (1939); Coleman v. Miller,
307 U.S. 433 (1939).
121.

See generaly State ex rel. Hatch v. Murray, 165 Mont. 90 (1974); Am. Fed'n of Lab. v. Eu,

686 P.2d 609 (Cal. 1984); Kimble v. Swackhamer, 584 P.2d 161 (Nev. 1978);
122.

Valker, 498 S.W.2d

State courts often have been called upon to interpret Article V issues, as in

102.

Valker,

498 S.W.2d at 102; State ex rel. Tate v. Sevier, 62 S.W.2d 895 (Mo. 1933); Trohimovich
v. Dep't of Lab. & Indust., 869 P.2d 95 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994); State ex rel. Askew v. Meier, 231
N.W.2d 821 (N.D. 1975); Chase v. Billings, 170 A. 903 (Vt. 1934).
123. Hawke v. Smith, 126 N.E. 400, 402 (Ohio 1919).
124. State ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant', 114 N.E. 55, 55 (Ohio 1916), affd, 241 U.S. 565 (1916).
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referendum as a power included in ratification] here elevates state above nation,
devitalizes the federal Constitution, makes it subject to as many interpretations as
there are states, and destroys its uniform operation throughout the nation."1 25
Surely the Ohio Supreme Court was not acting against all reason when it
concluded that the legislative ratification power under Article V was relatively broad
and expansive given Madison's statement that matters of details were best not set
in stone by the Framers.1 26 Although the Ohio justices recognized ratification as a
constitutional function, they saw it as a lawmaking function that could adjust to
include a public referendum since it already presumably included gubernatorial
assents that existed in some states and, as existed in at least three states when the
Constitution was adopted, an executive council that engaged in lawmaking for the
state.1 27 But Justice Day, speaking for the U.S. Supreme Court, held that
"legislature" in Article V means the lawmaking body understood by the Framers
and that ratification is not typical legislating and therefore does not adjust to new
forms that a state may adopt.1 28 Distinguishing ratification from typical legislating,
and overruling Hildebrandt,Justice Day insisted that ratification is a simple assent
to a proposed amendment. "[R]atification by a state of a constitutional amendment
is not an act of legislation within the proper sense of the word. It is but the
expression of the assent of the state to a proposed amendment."1 29 It seems,
therefore, Article V has boundaries that are more constraining than the lawmaking
function envisioned by Article 1.130
There is no doubt the Court was responding to a very real concern that
amendments, especially the Eighteenth, were being used in potentially new ways to
drive a legislative agenda that was being stalled by entrenched political interests. 131
If ratification were more like legislation, then logically amendments would be more
like legislation, and just about everyone was growing uncomfortable with that
prospect.1 32 Because so much of our Article V jurisprudence arose during the
constitutional panic of the Progressive and New Deal Eras, the Court's reliance on

125.
Hawke, 126 N.E. at 400.
126.
See Madison's remark that details should not be set forth in the constitution, in
BERNSTEIN & AGEL, supra note 14, at 21.
127.
Id. at 397.
128.
Id.
129.
Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 229 (1920).
130.
This is a tough distinction. It is straightforward to say that a legislature ratifying a
constitutional amendment is doing something different than lawmaking, even though both purportedly
bind the state, the legislature, and its people. On the other hand, ratification is only superficially
different from legislating at its core; it is simply a more binding and less easily reversed form
of lawmaking.
131.
KYVIG, supranote 6, at 240-49.
132.
Id.
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formalism was consistent with its Article V and broader constitutional jurisprudence
of the period.1 33
The other two state court decisions involving Article V were Wise
v. Chandler134 and Coleman v. Miller,135 both involving state ratifications after prior
rejections of the Child Labor Amendment. In Chandler, the Kentucky Supreme
Court had issued a lengthy decision voiding the legislative ratification on the
grounds that a legislature could only vote once on a proposed amendment and once
it had done so its job was over.1 36 The Supreme Court summarily reversed on
mootness grounds as the Kentucky Governor had already submitted the certificate
of ratification to Washington and, under Leser v. Garnett, that certificate was
conclusive on the issue of the legal sufficiency of the state's ratification.1 37
The Court handed down its decision in Chandler concurrent with its lengthy
opinion in Coleman, affirming the Kansas Supreme Court's approval of its
legislature's post-rejection ratification, although on different grounds.1 38 The
Kansas Supreme Court had held that legislatures could ratify after rejecting because
ratification was a one-way street; Article V spoke only of ratification and therefore,
as with legislation, multiple attempts could be made until the proposal passed.1 39 As
in Chandler, the issue of rescissions was not before the Court. Justice Hughes'
opinion in Coleman affirmed the result of the Kansas decision but on different
grounds. Rather than engaging the substantive issue of whether Article V permitted
states to change their minds, the Court simply held that, in the absence of
congressional direction, the Court would not interfere when the technical
requirements of Article V had been satisfied.14 0 Again, as in Hawke and Chandler,
the Court in Coleman adopted a formalistic interpretation that kept it from delving
into the procedural details raised by Article V's vague lack of direction.

133.
The period between the Sixteenth and the Twenty-First Amendments was profoundly
troubling to those on both sides of the aisle. For Progressives and New Deal democrats, the Supreme
Court's blockading of popular legislation through its enhanced level of scrutiny during the Lochner Era
seemed intractable, so that constitutional amendments appeared to be the only way around
anti-democratic stonewalling and political brinksmanship protecting deeply entrenched political
interests. For conservatives, the Progressive and New Deal Eras represented all that was frightening
about populism and democracy as the constitution was at risk of becoming not only the Statutes at
Large, but legislation that was virtually unamendable. Although the Twenty-First Amendment passed
in record time, anti-prohibitionists turned to repeal only after extensive efforts to defeat the Eighteenth
Amendment had failed in the courts. It was a disturbing lesson in the ways of constitutionalism that no
one wanted to repeat. Six amendments in twenty years, a seventh being considered by the states, and a
plethora of equal rights, labor, and old-age assistance proposals floating around Congress had virtually
everyone on edge. See generaly KYVIG, supranote 6.
134.
See Wise v. Chandler, 108 S.W.2d 1024 (Ky. 1937).
135.
See Coleman v. Miller, 71 P.2d 518 (Kan. 1937).
136.
108 S.W.2d at 1033.
137.
Chandler v. Wise, 307 U.S. 474, 477-78 (1939).
138.
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 450-51 (1939).
139.
Coleman, 71 P.2d. at 525-26.
140.
307 U.S. at 450-51.
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These three state-law decisions are informative and paradoxical. Although it is
clear that the Supreme Court, in all of its Progressive and New Deal Era cases,
refused to follow the White Rabbit down the Article V rabbit hole and instead
applied a formalistic, technical-compliance approach to the challenges before it, it
has inadvertently left us in the middle of a croquet game with nothing but hedgehogs
and flamingos. With so little guidance except a blinkered adherence to the cryptic
technical rules, the Court has stifled every state court attempt to directly address the
procedural gaps of Article V.
This does not mean that state courts are inherently ill-equipped or unable
to address the constitutional questions posed by these Article V procedural
uncertainties, but the need for uniformity on such issues of national importance
reinforces the conclusion that the federal courts are the more appropriate judicial
bodies.141 This is true even though state legislatures have large amounts of discretion
to structure and exercise their Article V ratification powers to suit their own
interests. Given the opposite conclusions drawn by the Kansas and Kentucky state
supreme courts as to whether states could ratify after rejecting a proposal, a uniform
national rule is not a bad idea.
Thus, where state courts are focused solely on the question of whether their
state legislature ratified in compliance with their own legislative rules, the state
courts could conceivably govern. Yet, what is the point of a state court holding that
a legislative ratification violated its own legislative rules if the certificate of
ratification has already been sent to the Archivist and has therefore become
conclusive?1 42 Because the state court has no jurisdiction to demand return or
cancellation of a certificate of ratification from a federal official, it would seem that
state courts could perhaps intercept a certificate before it is sent but would have no
power once the certificate has left the state, even if it was sent without
authorization.1 43 If a legislative committee or the governor simply submitted a
certificate of ratification to the Archivist, a state court writ of prohibition would be
too late, and a writ of mandamus against the Archivist to return the certificate would
be improper for lack of jurisdiction. As the Courts in Hawke and Dyer both noted,
national standards are necessary for these kinds of issues, despite the fact that the
Constitution leaves wide discretion to state legislatures to make procedural rules on
how to ratify proposals. That leaves us with Congress or the federal courts as the
best Article V decision makers.

141.
Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1303 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (Judge Stevens explained: "We are
persuaded that the word 'ratification' as used in article V of the federal Constitution must be interpreted
with the kind of consistency that is characteristic of judicial, as opposed to political, decision making.").
142.
This is the real conundrum of Chandler. 307 U.S. 474 (1939).
143.
This was discussed at length in the Kentucky Supreme Court decision in Wise v. Chandler,
108 S.W.2d 1024, 1034-36 (Ky. 1937).
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C. Congress
As with Guarantee Clause questions,1 44 there is some logic in thinking that
Congress should have the power to determine the legal sufficiency of state
ratifications. After all, state legislative ratifications are political decisions, just as the
congressional decision to propose an amendment is a political decision. But like the
Cheshire Cat, not all is immediately apparent about the logic of allowing Congress
to make these determinations. Because Congress is a key player in the Article V
process, it may have overstepped its authority in imposing a deadline on the states
and therefore might be tempted to exercise its decision-making power in political
rather than legal ways to cover up its constitutionally improper action. The decision
to impose a deadline was a highly political one;1 45 the decision whether the deadline
is constitutional arguably should not be highly political nor should it be left to the
entity that engaged in the highly political decision of imposing a deadline.
Furthermore, because amendments are essentially self-executing, there is no further
role for Congress once it has issued a proposal; the amendment becomes valid when
the last state ratifies. Allowing Congress to determine if the last state's ratification
is legally sufficient essentially returns the amendment back to the national legislature
in contravention of the founders' plan of leaving amendments primarily to the
control of the states. But to get through a logical analysis of Congress's authority
under Article V, and the political question issue, we need to continue our ramble
through the Article V wonderland with a lengthy detour through the history of
Congress's role in the amendment process.
1. PriorPrecedents
The Fourteenth Amendment provides a fertile source of precedents on the
role of Congress in the Article V amendment process. The Fourteenth Amendment
was proposed by Congress and sent to the states in June 1866, the result of extensive
committee negotiations and compromises among different political factions.1 46
Most northern states ratified it fairly quickly, but two issues quickly arose: did
Article V's requirement of three-fourths of the states mean three-fourths of all the
states or just the twenty-six states that remained after the rebellious states were
excluded, and did Congress have a two-thirds majority to propose the Amendment
when it lacked participation by the southern states?1 47 During the fall and winter of
1866, ten southern states voted to reject the Amendment, which meant that even if
all the other states had ratified, the Amendment would fail.1 48 In addition,
Tennessee's purported ratification was questionable at best as coercion, and

144.
See discussion supra at note 82 and accompanying text.
145.
See Wright, supra note 13, at 62-66.
146.
KYVIG, supranote 6, at 164-70.
147.
President Johnson objected to the proposal on the grounds that only twenty-five out of
thirty-six states were represented in Congress. Id. at 170.
148.
Id. at 171-72.

1050

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[
[Vol.
12.3:1019

imprisonment was likely not envisioned by the Framers to be within a state's
discretion to set its own ratification process.149
Throughout 1867, most northern states voted to ratify, but consensus grew
that the Fourteenth Amendment would require three-fourths (twenty-eight) of all
states (thirty-seven) to ratify.1 50 To speed the process, Congress passed the Military
Reconstruction Act, which stripped provisional southern governments of all power
and established military tribunals to hold elections and establish new southern
governments. Readmission to Congress required drafting new state constitutions,
conducting elections, and ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment.151 By the end of
1867, all but Texas had rewritten their suffrage requirements and allowed
reconstruction, allowing those states to begin considering the Fourteenth
Amendment. By that time, only five southern state ratifications were needed to put
the Amendment over the line, and that quickly happened by the summer of 1868.152
Unfortunately, the fall 1867 elections in some northern states had resulted in
Democratic victories, and Ohio and New Jersey both voted in early 1868 to repeal
their ratifications of the Fourteenth Amendment, although Governor Ward of New
Jersey vetoed its legislative rescission.1 53 The rescissions left both the Ohio and New
Jersey ratifications in limbo, as this was the first time a state had tried to rescind.
With the Louisiana and South Carolina ratifications on July 9, 1868, opinion was
split on whether the Fourteenth Amendment had been ratified or not.1 54 On July
20, Secretary of State William Seward listed all the states that had ratified, including
Ohio and New Jersey that had rescinded, and Louisiana, North Carolina, and South
Carolina that had previously rejected, as ratifying states in a conditional certification
of the Amendment.1 55
In acknowledging the withdrawal of support by Ohio and New Jersey,
Secretary Seward stated that the withdrawal was "a matter of doubt and uncertainty
whether such resolutions are not irregular, invalid and therefore ineffectual."1 56 In
this proclamation, Seward also noted that neither the Act of April 20, 1818, chapter
80, section 2, 3 (now 1 U.S.C. § 106(b)), nor any law, "expressly or by conclusive
implication, authorizes the Secretary of State to determine and decide doubtful
questions as to . . . the power of any State legislatures to recall a previous act or
resolution of ratification of any amendment proposed to the Constitution."1 57 In

149.
Opponents of the amendment in the Tennessee legislature hid to deny the two-thirds
legislative quorum required by Tennessee legislative rules, but some absent members were located and
arrested, thereby allowing them to be declared present, even though they did not vote. Id. at 170.
150.
Id. at 173.
151.
Id.
152.
Id. at 173-74.
153.
Id. at 174.
154.
Id. There were twenty-nine ratifications if Ohio and New Jersey were counted, one more
than necessary; there were only twenty-seven if they were not counted, one short. Id.
155.
Id. at 174-75.
156.
15 Stat. app. at 706, 707 (1868).
157.
Id.
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this case, Secretary Seward certified the Fourteenth Amendment but included in his
proclamation the outstanding legal question surrounding the withdrawal of support
by two states and noted that his certification was dependent on a legal determination
of this issue.1 58 Upon further ratifications, Secretary Seward's qualifications were
put to rest.
Seward's publication left to others the determination of whether the
Fourteenth Amendment was fully ratified and ultimately time settled the matter.
The next day, Congress adopted a concurrent resolution declaring the Fourteenth
Amendment ratified, listing Ohio, New Jersey, Louisiana, North Carolina, and
South Carolina as among the ratifiers.1 59 And after additional state ratifications
came in, Secretary Seward published an unconditional notice of the Amendment's
ratification a week later, on July 28, 1868.160
The importance of the Fourteenth Amendment procedure cannot be
underestimated, even if it has become overly influential. David Kyvig summarized
Article V procedure and where it stood after it was put to its first significant test:
Thus the Congress held that states could continue to consider an
amendment until they approved it but thereafter could not rescind that act.
Constitutional amendment was a specific procedure, not an ordinary
legislative process, and therefore conventional practices of reconsideration
did not apply. Perhaps under different circumstances other considerations
would have prevailed, but in 1868 Congress viewed the amendment
ratification process as a ratchet wheel that could move ahead but not
backward. The Fourteenth Amendment's adoption established a principle
that courts and Congress have since left untouched.161
The exceptional circumstances underlying ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment have been used by countless scholars and advocates for a variety of
conclusions about the procedure of Article V. Some asserted that Congress must
ultimately accept a constitutional amendment and that it does not become
automatically effective upon the last state's ratification,1 62 but that view was rejected
in 1920 by the Supreme Court in Dillon v. Gloss.163 Others argued that the inclusion
of Ohio and New Jersey meant that states are not permitted to rescind their
ratifications, although no court weighed in on the matter since subsequent

158.

Power of a State Legislature to Rescind its Ratification of a Constitutional Amendment, 1

Op. O.L.C. 13, 13 (1977).
159.
15 Stat. app. at 709-10 (1868).
160. Id. at 710-11.
161.
KYVIG, supra note 6, at 175.
162.
See Paulsen, supranote 18, at 706-21. This view was limited to Congressmen who insisted
that they continued to play a role in constitutional amending even after they had sent a proposal to the
states. See id. at 706-21 (discussing at length Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), and the possible
role of Congress in accepting or promulgating amendments); see also Congressional Pay Amendment,
supra note 34, at 99.
163.
256 U.S. 368 (1921).
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ratifications made the question moot.1 64 Fortunately, the exceptional circumstances
of Reconstruction have not been repeated and the question of whether
three-fourths of the states means three-fourths of all states or three-fourths of those
represented in Congress has so far not required further explication. Some still argue
that the Fourteenth Amendment was not validly adopted,1 65 but there is little
likelihood that the Court would reject the Amendment after a century and a half on
the basis of Tennessee's irregular counting of arrested delegates or New Jersey's
vetoed rescission.1 66 Time has healed all irregularities, and Secretary of State
Seward's proclamation of the Fifteenth Amendment as having been properly
ratified despite New York's rescission remains an idiosyncrasy of Article V's
procedure that can, like the Cheshire Cat, appear to reflect nearly any conclusion.1 67
The only other time Congress played a post-ratification role in an amendment
occurred with the Twenty-Seventh Amendment that was ratified by the states over
the course of more than two hundred years. Originally proposed as one of
Madison's original twelve amendments (of which only ten were adopted in 1791 as
the Bill of Rights), the Twenty-Seventh was ratified gradually throughout the
centuries, though most ratifications occurred in the late twentieth century as states
grew bitter at Congress's self-serving behavior.1 68 Because of the procedural
irregularity of an amendment proposal lingering for so long, the Office of Legal
Counsel issued a memorandum stating that the Twenty-Seventh Amendment was
validly ratified upon the last state's ratification vote, that Congress did not have
authority to proclaim it, and that the Archivist's publication was purely
ministerial.1 69 Nevertheless, Congress,
[r]ecognizing that the pay raise amendment represented an outburst of
anger at Congress, that its rejection on a technicality after endorsement by
so many states would likely provoke even greater outrage, and that, in any
case, it would only briefly delay pay raises, [overwhelmingly] .. . declared
the Twenty-Seventh Amendment properly adopted.1 70

164.

Although the district court of Idaho ruled that rescissions were permissible in Idaho

v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107, 1146-50 (D. Idaho 1981), that decision was vacated in Carmen v. Idaho,
459 U.S. 809 (1982).
165.
See Colby, supra note 5; see also Bryant, supra note 5; Harrison, supranote 5 (both admitting
there were irregularities but offering ways around them).
166.
And the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment is valid in the Slaughterhouse

Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wallace) 36, 71 (1872), and lower courts agree. See U.S. v. Gugel, 119 F. Supp. 897
(E.D. Ky. 1954); Maryland Petition Comm. v. Johnson, 265 F. Supp. 823 (D. Md. 1967). On the
validity of the Fifteenth Amendment, see United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876); Neale v. Delaware,
103 U.S. 370 (1881); Guinnv. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915).
167.

Paulsen, supranote 18, at 718-20.

168. Richard B. Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes: The Histoy and Legacy of the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 497, 498, 534-39 (1992).
169.
170.

Congressional Pay Amendment, supra note 34, at 99.
KYVIG, supranote 6, at 469.
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It seems safe to conclude that Congress has no role in accepting or declaring an
amendment valid; that occurs immediately upon ratification by the last state.
Nevertheless, saying that Congress has no role once the last state has ratified
is of little moment if we are concerned with whether a state has in fact ratified or
not. The precedents of the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth Amendments support the
conclusion that states may only ratify and may not rescind.171 Yet even on that point
there remains significant disagreement.1 72 However, despite the Supreme Court's
conclusion in Dillon v. Gloss in 1920 that amendments become effective upon
ratification by the last state, the Court offered the tantalizing conclusion that Article
V issues are nonjusticiable political questions and that Congress does have the
power to impose deadlines, determine when unlimited proposals have passed their
shelf life, and determine whether post-rejection ratifications or post-ratification
rescissions are valid.1 73 In other words, Congress may have a role to play in
determining the legal sufficiency of ratifications but has none once those
ratifications are confirmed. The notoriously convoluted opinion in Coleman v. Miller
from 1939, the last of the Court's pronouncements on Article V procedures and the
only decision suggesting that Congress has a decisive role after the states have
ratified,1 74 is problematic on many levels. For just as we thought we had reached
some stable ground, the paradoxical decision floats out to us on the smoke of the
hookah, making about as much sense as the mutterings of the Mad Hatter and the
riddles of the Caterpillar. For if Congress has no role once the requisite number of
ratification certificates are submitted, when might Congress assert its political
authority to judge the sufficiency of the ratifications? Certainly not until enough
states have ratified so the issue is no longer unripe. For that is the paradox
of Coleman.1 75
2. Coleman v. Miller
In 1924, Kansas rejected the Child Labor Amendment when it was first
proposed.1 76 Thirteen years later, the Kansas legislature ratified the Amendment
with the Lieutenant Governor casting the tie-breaking vote in the Senate.1 77
Disgruntled senators brought suit claiming that the state could not ratify after it had
rejected the Amendment, that the ratification violated Article V because the

171.
See Congressional Pay Amendment,supra note 34, at 104-05.
172.
Paulsen, supranote 18, at 726-31 (suggesting that rescissions are allowed because they are
analogous to legislation, which is clearly repealable). But see Kanowitz & Klinger, supranote 18 (rejecting
the rescission power on the basis of text and precedent).

173.
174.

Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 374 (1921).
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1939).

175.
Once sufficient states have ratified to satisfy Article V, the amendment is self-executing
and there is no congressional role. If not enough states have ratified, then any statement Congress
makes on the validity of state ratifications would be premature and ineffective.
176.
Coleman, 307 U.S. at 435.
177. Id. at 435-36.
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Lieutenant Govemor participated in the ratification, and that the thirteen-year delay
between proposal and ratification was unreasonably long and showed that the
amendment proposal had lost its vitality.1 78 The Kansas Supreme Court ruled that
the ratification was valid.1 79
In a convoluted opinion on appeal, Chief Justice Hughes issued a majority
ruling on three of the four issues.1 80 The Court held that the individual senators had
standing.181 The Court was divided on whether the Lieutenant Governor could
participate under Article V's dictate that ratification be by state "legislatures," and
therefore the Court issued no opinion.18 2 Ironically, on the one technical procedural
irregularity the Court could come to no conclusion, thus allowing the lower court
decision to stand that the vote was permissible.
On the issue of whether a state could ratify after it had rejected, the Court
refused to interfere with the Secretary of State's recording of the ratification. Chief
Justice Hughes explained:
Article V, speaking solely of ratification, contains no provisions as to
rejection. Nor has the Congress enacted a statute relating to rejections.
[The only statutory provision entails the Secretary of State causing an
amendment to be published when it has been adopted]. The statute
presupposes official notice to the Secretary of State when a state legislature
has adopted a resolution of ratification. We see no warrant for judicial
interference with the performance of that duty.1 83
The Caterpillar could not have said it any more enigmatically. Presumably,
according to Leser, once official notice to the Secretary of State has been submitted,
there is simply no further role for the Court. But if Congress were to legislate in
some manner, the Court might have some issue to decide, although its decision
would be deferential because the Court would not want to substitute its judgment
for that of Congress. Because Congress had not legislated in regard to the efficacy
of ratifications after rejections, however, the Court declined to intervene. 184 Yet
again that begs the question: could Congress even legislate in the first place? And
that question is not answered at all.
The Court's decision in Coleman must be understood in light of the fact that
the Thirteenth through Seventeenth Amendments all experienced post-rejection
ratifications1 85 and yet, more than half a century after the ratification of the

178.
Id. at 436.
179.
Coleman v. Miller, 71 P.2d 518, 527 (Kan. 1937).
180.
Coleman, 307 U.S. at 435.
181.
Id. at 438-39.
182.
Id. at 456.
183.
Id. at 450-51.
184.
Id. at 456.
185.
Georgia, Connecticut, and Massachusetts ratified the Bill of Rights a century and a half
later in 1939 after having been unable to reconcile the different positions of their two houses;
Massachusetts ratified the Twelfth Amendment more than a century and a half after rejecting it; New
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Thirteenth Amendment, the Court was faced with the issue for the first time. And
the 1937 challenges produced a split in the state courts. 186 With no guidance from
Congress, the Court let sleeping dogs lie. It summarily reversed the Kentucky
decision that its ratification was invalid on the grounds that the ratification
certificate was conclusive, and it affirmed the Kansas decision that its ratification
was valid on the simple grounds that Congress had not expressed an opinion by
legislating on the issue. By no means should the decision be taken to mean that the
Court would defer if Congress had acted; it simply means that without congressional
action there was no reason to upset the apple cart. Essentially, without congressional
action there was no case or controversy other than to resolve the split, which the
Court did based on a technical reading of Article V and the Eighteenth Amendment
cases stating ratification certificates were conclusive. Voila! Like the Cheshire Cat,
all difficulties disappeared by affirming the Kansas Supreme Court's outcome on
the grounds that Congress had not created a procedural speed bump.
Furthermore, in refusing to substitute its judgment when Congress had not
chosen to act by legislating on these Article V issues, the Court was not saying that
it was relinquishing its obligation to review congressional action now or in the
future.1 87 Were Congress to legislate that no state ratifications would be deemed
valid unless they were endorsed by a public referendum, a requirement that would
be clearly at odds with the plain text of Article V, the Court would surely strike the
legislation. There is nothing in Justice Hughes's opinion to suggest that the Court
had adopted the political question reasoning of the four concurring justices who
argued that all ratification and Article V issues were nonjusticiable. Such reasoning
would have required the Court to defer to Congress on all Article V matters, even
if Congress were to legislate in a manner that clearly conflicted with the text of
Article V, and dismiss all cases before it. Undoubtedly, Justice Hughes, the two

Jersey and Delaware ratified after rejecting the Thirteenth Amendment; North Carolina, Louisiana,
South Carolina, Georgia, Virginia, Delaware, Kentucky, and Maryland ratified after rejecting the
Fourteenth Amendment; Ohio, New Jersey, Delaware, Oregon, California, Maryland, Kentucky, and
Tennessee ratified after rejecting the Fifteenth Amendment; Arkansas and New Hampshire ratified
after rejecting the Sixteenth Amendment, and Delaware ratified the Seventeenth Amendment nearly a
century after first rejecting it. See GOV'T PUBL'G OFF., AMENDMENTS, supra note 48, at 25 nn.2-9.
186.
CompareSee Wise v. Chandler, 108 S.W.2d 1024 (Ky. 1937) with Coleman v. Miller, 71 P.2d
518 (Kan. 1937).
187.
It is important to note that the Court was merely refusing to legislate from the bench, a
judicial action that has, historically, been frowned upon. The Court acknowledged that Congress could
have legislated on this issue. So, instead of inserting its own judgment in the space left open by
Congress' inaction, the Court relied on the plain text of Article V to hold that the Kansas ratification
was valid. This is quite different from affirmatively relinquishing all jurisdiction to evaluate whether any
future act by Congress might exceed the scope of its constitutionally granted powers under Article V.
Congress had not asserted a constitutional power to determine the validity of a state ratification, so the
Court did not need to resolve the issue of whether the courts would be prohibited from ruling on the
constitutionality of any future acts of Congress in this area. It does not follow that, if the Court declines
to fill a legislative void left by Congress, it would lose its power to review an act of Congress when it
finally does choose to legislate.
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dissenters, and the two justices who joined his opinion all rejected such an extreme
abdication of judicial responsibility.' 88 Had they adopted the reasoning of their four
brethren, surely they would have done so more explicitly, since doing so would have
overruled the decisions in every prior case involving Article V. But not getting
involved when there was no dispute was the Court's way of punting on the issue
until it required resolution, i.e., when and if Congress were to overstep its bounds
and interfere with the discretion granted to the states by Article V, the courts
would intervene. 189
On the fourth issue of whether the proposal had become stale because of
passage of time, the Court also refused to legislate from the bench when Congress
had not acted. The Court held that if Congress did not choose to impose a deadline,
it was inappropriate for the courts to determine whether an amendment had become
stale.1 90 Again, there was no reason to render a decision when Congress had not
taken a position that was potentially at odds with Article V. Had Congress imposed
a deadline, and that deadline had passed and states were ratifying regardless, then a
justiciable issue would require the Court's resolution-the resolution that is now
required as a result of the ERA ratifications.
In sum, the Coleman Court approved standing for the disgruntled legislators
but denied them any remedy as Congress had not done anything that would
potentially infringe the ratification function of the states. Hughes's opinion no
doubt lacks the kind of clarity one would like to have on such an important matter.
In the absence of a constitutional controversy, Chief Justice Hughes affirmed a
technical, formalistic reading of Article V, affirmed the Court's jurisdiction, did not
upset any historical or judicial precedents, and did not cede the Court's authority to
settle a dispute in a case in which Congress or a state actually acted contrary to
Article V. Nor did the Court upset the fifty years of prior practice in which
post-rejection ratifications had been recognized. The Coleman decision is clearly an
attempt to uphold state ratification without setting any precedent that might limit
the Courtin future cases and should therefore be understood as not providing much
guidance for our Article V quest.191 If Coleman is the battery for our headlamps, it
casts a feeble light indeed.
3. Congress Is Not an Appropriate Decision Makerfor Article V Questions
Of course, the Court saying it will not interfere if Congress does not act tells
us nothing about what it should or might do if Congress does act, as with the

188.

Seegeneraly Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).

189.
This is arguably where we are with the ERA today.
190.
Coleman, 307 U.S. at 459-60.
191.
The Child Labor Amendment was proposed in response to the Supreme Court's ruling
striking down the child labor provision of the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act in Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918). That case was not overruled until two years after Coleman in 1941, in United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17 (1941).
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congressional deadline. Thus, what if Congress were to legislate in a way that
infringed the powers of the states or a state ratified contrary to Article V? These are
quintessentially political decisions, so why not let Congress have the final word on
the legal sufficiency of state ratifications under these circumstances? Despite the
Coleman precedent, and the fact that it has not been repudiated by the Court, there
are numerous reasons why Congress should not make Article V determinations
about the legal sufficiency of state ratifications and, if it tried, the Court should step
in to stop Congress from doing so.
One obvious reason is that Coleman is not really a precedent. And if it is, it is
unclear what the precedent stands for. It does not stand for the broad proposition
that all Article V matters are nonjusticiable political questions because only four
justices espoused that view and later federal courts have denied that Coleman
requires dismissal of Article V procedural cases.1 92 Moreover, the political question
doctrine is essentially a separation-of-powers issue and not a federalism issue. In
outlining the parameters of the political question doctrine, the Supreme Court
established that "it is the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate
branches of the Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary's relationship to
the States, which gives rise to the 'political question' .... The nonjusticiability of a
political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers."1 93 At heart,
however, Article V issues center on federalism concerns, such as whether Congress
has overstepped its bounds vis-a-vis the states in imposing time limits or other
constraints. Article V issues also arise when considering state relations vis-a-vis each
other, as whether rescissions should be permitted to destabilize the process of
ratification. Neither is a separation of powers issue, which suggests that the political
question complaint is a red herring. In allowing Congress to control the Article V
process, courts would be permitting the national legislature to redefine the scope
and procedures of constitutional amending in contravention of the Framers' clear
94
insistence that states have primary control over the process.1
But then the Court's enigmatic statement in Dillon that Congress may have
authority to set some technical details rears its head.1 95 Now we are back in
Wonderland trying to figure out if a deadline or a requirement of a supermajority
or an intervening election or a public referendum or gubernatorial approval of a
state ratification are matters of technical detail or unconstitutional constraints on
the states. If some, according to Dillon, are technical details and others overstep
Congress's Article V authority, how do we know which is which and who decides?

192.
See, e.g., Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107
(D. Idaho 1982), vacated, Carmen v. Idaho, 459 U.S. 809 (1982).
193.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). It is also the case that the political question
doctrine has been updated in recent years and the direction it has taken is away from, not towards, a
conclusion that Article V issues are nonjusticiable. For a fuller discussion of this, see Hajdu
& Rosenblum, supra note 15, at 147-59.
194.
See discussion infra Section III.A.3.
195.
Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 376 (1921).
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One could reasonably accept Congress specifying that notice of a ratification should
be sent to the Archivist, Secretary of State, or to itself; or that notice shall be sent
by certified mail; or should be sent by the governor within ten days of the legislative
vote. These are details that facilitate the orderly process of amending. Legislation
requiring a public referendum or a supermajority or setting deadlines are all
"technical details" that hamper, interfere with, and frustrate state ratification
procedures. Details that make it harder on states should not be deemed mere
matters of technical detail. And clearly it should not be up to Congress to decide on
which side of the line its legislative details might fall.
Giving Congress sole authority to determine the legal sufficiency of state
ratifications also could put Congress in the dubious position where it might hold
against ratifications of a proposal that sought to limit federal authority, which was
a prospect much feared by the Framers.1 96 It might also vote in favor of
questionable ratifications that serve its own goals, as we saw with the Fourteenth
Amendment. One can easily imagine a lame-duck Congress affirming improper
state ratifications in the face of an electoral loss that was caused by Congress's
unpopular position on an amendment. There are too many whiffs of the Eighteenth
Amendment debacle here to simply shrug off the consequences.
Scholars have also agreed that Coleman is an unreliable precedent, as it was the
product of the contemporary political situation in 1939, a mere two years after the
threatened court packing plan and the validation of New Deal Legislation.1 97 The
Court had already been damaged by its Lochner-era activism, and the last thing
Justice Hughes wanted to do in 1939 was damage it further. As Michael Stokes
Paulsen has noted, the political question doctrine articulated in Coleman "could be
interpreted to assert a degree of unchecked congressional authority over the
ratification process that is arguably anti-constitutional."1 98 Paulsen also notes that
the "congressional power theory . .. rationalizes anything Congress does concerning

196.
See infra Section III.A.3.
197.
Michael Stokes Paulsen rails against Coleman'sbad history and bad law, in his A General
Theory of Article V, supra note 18, at 707-18, and suggests that it was most likely the result of the
awkward position in which the Court found itself of potentially judging the sufficiency of a ratification
of an amendment that was designed to overturn a decision of the Court itself. Id. at 717. Robert Hajdu
and Bruce Rosenblum, supra note 15, at 144-47 agree that the political question theory of Coleman is
problematic. Dellinger, supranote 15, at 388, calls Coleman "profoundly wrong, and it should no longer
be followed." William H. White, Note, Article V: Political Questions and Sensible Answers, 57
TEX. L. REV. 1259, 1259 (1979) argues that "application of a prudential political question doctrine to
article V issues is theoretically and precedentially unwarranted." It would also be unseemly for the
Court to interject in an amendment process designed to reverse its own decision. The Child
Labor Amendment was proposed to reverse the Court's 1918 decision in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251 (1918).
198.
THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., THE PROPOSED EQUAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT: CONTEMPORARY RATIFICATION ISSUES 27 (2019); see also Paulsen, supra note 18, at
706-07, 718-21.
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the amendment process ... [and] simply cannot be squared with the text of Article
V or with basic principles of limited constitutional govemment."1 99
Lower courts have also rejected the reasoning in Coleman, recognizing that it
was an unusual set of facts with limited precedential value. The court in Dyer v. Blair
distinguished Coleman, reasoning that the holding in Coleman "was based on the
absence of any acceptable criteria for making a judicial determination of whether
the proposed amendment had lost its vitality through lapse of time." 200 The Dyer
court further reasoned:
It is primarily the character of the standards, not merely the difficulty of
their application, that differentiates between those which are political and
those which are judicial. The mere fact that a court has little or nothing but
the language of the Constitution as a guide to its interpretation does not
mean the task of construction is judicially unmanageable. 20 1
The Dyer court also pointed to the Supreme Court's consideration of amendment
ratification deadlines in Dillon v. Gloss as suggesting that even a lack of an "express
provision on the subject" in the Constitution does not render an issue
nonjusticiable. 20 2 And in addressing Coleman directly, Judge Stevens wrote:
There is force to . . . [the political question] argument since it was expressly
accepted by four Justices of the Supreme Court in Coleman v. Miller. But
since a majority of the Court refused to accept that position in that case,
and since the Court has on several occasions decided questions arising
under Article V, even in the face of "political question" contentions, that
argument is not one which a District Court is free to accept.203
And the District Court in Idaho v. Freeman concurred. 20 4 That court explained why
it asserted jurisdiction and rejected the political question doctrine in a case involving
the ERA: "While the questions presented for this Court's determination deal
essentially with the relationship and allocation of authority between the Congress
and the states pursuant to Article V of the Constitution, the antecedent question of
who decides what that relationship is must be decided." 205 In fact, the Idaho District
Court expressed precisely the relevant consideration of the political question
claim: "giving plenary power to Congress to control the amendment process runs
completely counter to the intentions of the founding fathers in including Article V
206
with its particular structure in the Constitution."

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Paulsen, supra note 18, at 723.
390 F. Supp. 1291, 1302 (N.D. II1. 1975); 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
Dyer, 390 F. Supp. at 1302.
Id. (citing Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 373 (1921)).
Id. at 1299-3000.

204.

529 F. Supp. 1107, 1125-26 (D. Idaho 1981).

205.
Id. at 1124.
206.
Id. at 1126. Judge Callister cited Professor Orfield as follows: "From the point of view of
orderly amending procedure it is doubtful that the doctrine of political question should be extended to
other procedural steps. If orderly procedure is essential in the enactment of ordinary statutes, should it
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The point here is that if Congress has not done anything to violate the
federalism balance of Article V, there is no reason for the courts to intervene. The
same is true if the states have not violated their Article V powers, which they have
only done in the case of Ohio's popular referendum that was quickly struck down
and Florida and Tennessee's intervening election requirements that were also
quickly struck down. 20 7 Thus, it would seem that only the federal courts are well
suited to establish nationwide standards for how the states can exercise their Article
V ratification function, and only the federal courts can impartially balance Congress
and the states' federalism disputes if Congress oversteps its Article V bounds by
passing legislation or imposing unreasonable constraints on the states through its
proposal or mode of ratification powers, or if the states upset the delicate balance
of ratification by rescinding.
D. FederalCourts
There is strong scholarly consensus that the federal courts should maintain
jurisdiction over Article V cases, despite the one-off decision of Coleman v. Miller,
and subsequent lower courts have agreed. 208 As noted above, the District Court of
Illinois exercised jurisdiction in Dyer v. Blair, and the District Court of Idaho
exercised jurisdiction in Idaho v. Freeman. And of course, the Supreme Court did not
reverse any of its prior cases adjudicating Article V issues in Coleman. But
unfortunately, the federal courts have not enthusiastically embraced their Article V
jurisdiction either. Where possible, they have entirely avoided relevant issues. In
other instances, they have decided only the specific issue at hand without providing
guidance for similar issues in the future. And in some instances, they have made
resolution by the federal courts even more difficult by holding that ratification
certificates are conclusive despite allegations of impropriety. It is this last point that
makes judicial resolution of the ERA issues so confounding and sends us deeper
into the Article V maze.
The Supreme Court has issued only nine decisions on procedural issues
involving Article V in its nearly two-and-a-half centuries of operation. Eight of
those decisions occurred during the constitutional panic of the 1920s and 1930s and
should be understood within that context.20 9 Two of those were dismissed for lack

not even more so as to the adoption of important and permanent constitutional amendments?" Id. at
1139 n.47.
207.
Trombetta v. Florida, 353 F. Supp. 575 (M.D. Fla. 1973); Walker v. Dunn, 498 S.W.2d
102 (Tenn. 1972).
208.
See, e.g., Marty Haddad, Note, Substantive Content of ConstitutionalAmendments: Political

Question or Justiciable Concern?, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1685 (1996); White, supra note 197; Dellinger,
supra note 15; Dunker, supra note 18 (all arguing for justiciability of substantive issues involving
amendment ratifications).
209.
See KYVIG, supra note 6, at 240-67. By January of 1918, three constitutional amendments
had been ratified in a span of five years, and another was working its way through Congress: woman's
suffrage. Id. Only with ratification of the Bill of Rights and the reconstruction amendments had there
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of standing or mootness grounds, and two others were challenges claiming that
there were substantive limits to Article V to prevent certain types of amendments
that might interfere with the state police power or dilute state suffrage rules.2 10 In
essence, in only five cases did the Court issue opinions that might have some
relevance to the questions we are facing with the ERA.2 1 1
The first decision, Ho/ingsworth v. Virginia in 1798,212 held that the President
has no Article V function. After Ho//ingsworth, it was over a century before Hawke
v. Smith held that Article V prohibited Ohio's constitutional amendment requiring
a public referendum. 213 In Hawke, the Court adopted a technical and narrow reading
of Article V that interpreted the word "legislatures" to mean only the commonly
understood political bodies of the state and not the people themselves, even if the
latter had legislative functions. 214 Striking down the referendum placed Article V's
form over function and hewed closely to the technical requirements of amending.
In striking the referendum requirement, the Court established that a ratified
amendment will not be voided by the courts, a position from which it has never
deviated.2 15 Notably, Hawke was brought by a proponent of the Eighteenth
Amendment who sought to divert any challenges that might undermine it.216
After Hawke, seven lawsuits were consolidated into the National Prohibition
Cases, challenging the Eighteenth Amendment on substantive grounds for invading
the sovereignty of the states, usurping the police power of the states, and

been such significant amendment activity, and both periods were characterized by profound social and
political upheaval. Id. And conservatives were understandably very nervous about the direction the
country was taking. Id. Constitutional amendments promoting populism, expanding democratic
engagement, and usurping state police powers had passed and more seemed likely to pass in the near
future. Id. The union of independent states was becoming a unitary nation, governed by a strong central
government-everything the Anti-federalists had feared. Id. Using the amendment power of Article V
to enshrine ordinary political preferences, like Prohibition and the Child Labor Amendment, was
viewed as a tremendous threat to the balance of federal and state powers enshrined in the Constitution
by the founders and as an existential threat to our constitutional republic. Id.
210.
Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922); Chandler v. Wise, 307 U.S. 474 (1939).
211.
Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dallas) 378 (1798); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221
(1920); Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922); Coleman v. Miller,

307 U.S. 433 (1939).
212.
3 U.S. (3 Dallas) at 381 n.*. In ruling that the Eleventh Amendment cut off all pending
and future suits, the Court dropped a footnote that amendments are unlike regular legislation and do
not require presidential approval. Id.
213.
253 U.S. at 231.
214.
Id. at 227-28.
215.
Id. An identical case against the Nineteenth Amendment, Hawke v Smith, No. II, 253 U.S.
231 (1920), was summarily dismissed on the same grounds as Hawke I.
216.
KYVIG, supra note 6 at 243. And there were many challenges at the state level that went
nowhere, even before Hanke was handed down. As with Coleman and Chandler, however, there were
state-level splits as to whether Article V procedures could include public participation. State ex rel.
Askew v. Meier, 231 N.W.2d 821 (N.D. 1975); Kimble v. Swackhamer, 584 P.2d 161(Nev. 1978); State
ex rel. Tate v. Sevier, 62 S.W.2d 895 (Mo. 1933); In re Opinion of the justices, 107 A. 673 (Me. 1919);
Brown v. Sec'y of State of Florida, 668 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2012).
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encroaching on local self-govemment. 217 In those cases, anti-prohibitionists claimed
that Article V powers were limited to proceduralamendments that did not infringe
on the self-governing police power of the states.218 Again, the Supreme Court was
unsympathetic to these arguments and upheld the Eighteenth Amendment as
meeting the formalistic requirements of Article V, despite the effect of potentially
negating the popular will and infringing on the autonomy of the states.2 19 A decade
later, in U.S. v. Sprague, a similar challenge to the Eighteenth Amendment succeeded
in a District Court, which held that because Prohibition imposed substantive limits
on the state and was not ratified by convention, it was invalid.220 The Court swiftly
disposed of the challenge, reversing the District Court's decision and stating that
"[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and
phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical
meaning; where the intention is clear there is no room for construction and no
excuse for interpolation or addition." 221
By 1931 the Court was tired of judicial challenges to a properly ratified
amendment, and it refused to accept any arguments that there were substantive or
procedural limitations to Article V. Once ratified, the Amendment had become part
of the Constitution regardless of any alleged improprieties or the Amendment's
imprudence. 222 Holingsworth, Hawke, Sprague, and the NationalProhibition Cases are
all irrelevant to the specific issues raised by the ERA, but they are valuable examples
of the Court's formalism, textualism, and antipathy toward Article V disputes. The
decisions are short, affirm the amendment, and do little else.
The first case to raise an issue that is relevant to the ERA was Dillon v. Gloss,
which came before the Supreme Court seeking to void the Eighteenth Amendment
based solely on the existence of the deadline. 223 It, too, failed. The Court held the
deadline did not void the Eighteenth Amendment because, once again, the proposal
met the technical requirements of Article V; it was passed by two-thirds of both
houses, and the Amendment was then ratified by three-fourths of the states. 224 The
Court did state, however, that Congress may have the power to impose a deadline
as a "matter of detail." Justice Van Devanter stated:

217.

Nat'l Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920).

218.
Id. at 354, 367.
219.
Id. at 386.
220.
United States v. Sprague, 44 F.2d 967, 986 (D.N.J. 1930), rev'd, 282 U.S. 716, 733-34 (1931).
221.
Sprague, 282 U.S. at 731(.
222.
Id. at 732. ("If the framers of the instrument had any thought that amendments differing
in purpose should be ratified in different ways, nothing would have been simpler than so to phrase
Article V as to exclude implication or speculation. The fact that an instrument drawn with such
meticulous care and by men who so well understood how to make language fit their thought does not
contain any such limiting phrase affecting the exercise of discretion by the Congress in choosing
one or the other alternative mode of ratification is persuasive evidence that no qualification
was intended.").
223.
256 U.S. 368 (1921).
224.
Id. at 373-74.
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As a rule the Constitution speaks in general terms, leaving Congress to deal
with subsidiary matters of detail as the public interests and changing
conditions may require: and article 5 is no exception to the rule. Whether
a definite period for ratification shall be fixed, so that all may know what
it is and speculation on what is a reasonable time may be avoided, is, in our
opinion, a matter of detail which Congress may determine as an incident
of its power to designate the mode of ratification. 225
Justice Van Devanter continues by noting that seven years was reasonable "ifpower
existed to fix a definite time," since the time period was not challenged and prior
amendments had been ratified in much shorter times. 226 But here the Court has
created a paradox that thrusts the ERA ratification into unmapped territory. The
Twenty-Seventh Amendment took over two hundred years and the ERA took
forty-eight years to be ratified. Historical practice does not necessarily support the
reasonableness of a seven-year deadline, and the opinion itself calls into question
whether Congress has the power in the first place. The qualification of "if power
existed to fix a definite time" makes us realize that what the Court said earlier was
mere dicta about deadlines being "matter[s] of detail." 227 Under the Court's
textualist interpretation that the Eighteenth Amendment was properly ratified
within the relevant time period, it was not necessary to rule on whether Congress
has such power, and so the deadline was nothing but an irrelevant afterthought.
A year later, the Nineteenth Amendment was challenged in Leser v. Garnettby
a Maryland citizen claiming that the Amendment was not properly ratified by a
number of states. 228 Maryland had not ratified the Nineteenth Amendment, but the
requisite number of states had. Three arguments were made that were disposed of
in the brief, four-paragraph decision. The first, that adding women to the voter rolls
violated a provision of the Maryland Constitution that limited suffrage to men, was
rejected because the argument that adding to the voter rolls was unconstitutional
would have voided the Fifteenth Amendment as well.2 29 Plus, this was basically an
argument that Maryland law conflicted with the Amendment and therefore should
not be subject to its operation. After so many years, the Court was not going to
accept an argument that non-ratifying states could not be bound by a ratified
amendment. Second, petitioners argued that the legislatures of many states were
prohibited from ratifying the Amendment because of various prohibitions in their
state constitutions. The Court rejected this argument by noting that ratification of
a federal constitutional amendment is a federal function, not a state function, and
therefore state constitutional limitations on expanding suffrage were irrelevant. 230
Third, the Court dismissed the claim that Tennessee and West Virginia may have

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 376.
Id.
Id.
258 U.S. 130, 136 (1922).
Id. at 136.
Id. at 136-37.
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violated their own ratification procedures because additional states had ratified,
making the issue moot.231 However, in discussing this third matter, Justice Brandeis
stated: "As the Legislatures of Tennessee and of West Virginia had power to adopt
the resolutions of ratification, official notice to the Secretary, duly authenticated,
that they had done so, was conclusive upon him, and, being certified to by his
proclamation, is conclusive upon the courts." 2 32
Once again, the Court has made our Article V journey more difficult. If
certificates of ratification are conclusive, then what is to stop a state from
submitting a certificate on blatantly improper grounds? The better result would
have been to get to the substance and hold that Article V does not permit Tennessee
to require an intervening election, just like it does not permit a popular referendum,
and that a state senator rushing home from a trip to break a tie vote is not a violation
of a state's ratification power.233 But rather than assert jurisdiction and decide on
the merits, the Court took an enigmatic position that state ratification certificates
are conclusive. A similar challenge to the Nineteenth Amendment, Fairchild
v. Hughes, was dismissed for lack of standing.234 Fairchildand Leser together make it
difficult to challenge the legal sufficiency of a state's ratification if it has been
submitted to the Secretary of State, or now the Archivist.
The final two cases, Chandler v. Wise 23 5 and Coleman v. Miller,236 raised
technical questions about irregularities in state ratifications that the Court again
refused to upset based on technical satisfaction of Article V. In Chandler, the Court
dismissed the case on mootness grounds, relying on the conclusiveness of state
certificates, concluding:
We think that, while the state court had jurisdiction in limine, the writ of
certiorari237 should be dismissed upon the ground that after the Governor
of Kentucky had forwarded the certification of the ratification of the

231.

Id. at 137.

232.
Id. It was suggested in Trombetta that the challenge to the Tennessee ratification was that
it violated a state constitutional requirement of an intervening election. Trombetta v. Florida, 353
F. Supp. 575, 577-78 (M.D. Fla. 1973). Thus, although the Court in Leser did not expressly strike down
intervening election requirements, it upheld Tennessee's ratification despite the state's neglected
constitutional requirement. Leser, 258 U.S. at 137.
233.
See KYVIG, supranote 6, at 237.

234.
235.
236.

258 U.S. 126, 129-30 (1922).
307 U.S. 474 (1939).
307 U.S. 443 (1939).

237.
The litigants in Chandler sought a restraining order and writ of mandamus to prohibit the
Kentucky governor from transmitting the resolution to Washington or, in the alternative, to require
that he ask for it to be returned or notify the Secretary of State that it was void and ineffective. Since
the state courts would have no jurisdiction over the U.S. Secretary of State, the disgruntled legislators
sued their Governor over whom the state court would have jurisdiction. On appeal to the U.S. Supreme
Court, however, the justices dismissed because once the certificate had been submitted to Washington,
it was deemed conclusive under Leser v. Garnett and no further action was appropriate.
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amendment to the Secretary of State of the United States there was no
longer a controversy susceptible of judicial determination. 238
Coleman v. Miller, discussed at length above, is a rambling, convoluted opinion in
which the Court could not agree on the technical issue of the Lieutenant Governor's
role in the Kansas ratification and otherwise upheld the ratification after rejection
because there was no case or controversy. 2 39
Conclusions from this paucity of cases suggest the following: (1) the Court will
read Article V procedures narrowly, according to the plain text, and will affirm an
amendment if it meets the technical requirements; (2) an inoperative deadline will
not void an otherwise properly ratified amendment; (3) states may ratify after
rejecting a proposal; (4) regular citizens do not have standing to challenge an
amendment; and (5) state ratification certificates and the Secretary of State's
publication of ratification are conclusive on certain aspects of the legal sufficiency
of state ratification procedures. 240
From one perspective, it seems that we could have been making headway in
escaping our Article V adventure by realizing that the Coleman suggestion of
nonjusticiability is a red herring and that the federal courts have the jurisdiction and
the tools to resolve our two substantive questions. But then we run right into that
brick wall from Leser, repeated in Chandler and Sprague, that state ratification
certificates are conclusive. If the Court wants to stick to that position, we may be
truly lost in Wonderland with no path out.
For if they are conclusive, then there is no stopping an overeager governor
from submitting certificates to Washington on her own accord, on the vote of a
legislative committee, on a vote with all opposing members imprisoned and denied
a voice, or even when passed by a simple majority instead of the legislatively
required supermajority. Had the Illinois Secretary of State simply sent the ERA
ratification to Washington, even though the vote violated both the Illinois
Constitution and its own legislative rules, we might have had the ERA back in 1978.
In a wacky 2015 Texas case (of course it's from Texas), a petitioner claimed
the Seventeenth Amendment was improperly ratified and therefore void because of
purported irregularities in the Wisconsin and California ratifications. 24 ' The Texas

238.

Chandler, 307 U.S. at 477-78.

239.
See discussion supra Section II.C.2.
240.
Lower courts have affirmed the narrow scope of the political question doctrine in the case
of constitutional amendments. In United States v. Vojtas, No. 85 CR 45, 1985 WL 1963, at *2
(N.D. Ill. 1985), the court stated in response to a challenge to the Sixteenth Amendment that "the
Supreme Court has ruled that the Secretary's proclamation is conclusive, and that courts cannot inquire
as to the possibly erroneous basis of his finding." In United States v. Sluk, No. M-18-304, 1979 WL
1474, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), the court rejected an argument by a taxpayer that he did not owe his
federal income taxes because the Seventeenth Amendment which provides for the popular election of
Senators was an unconstitutional alteration of the Constitution and that therefore the tax provision
enacted in part by the Senate was unconstitutional.
241.
Kidd v. Cascos, No. 03-14-00805-CV, 2015 WL 9436655, at *1 (Tex. App. 2015).
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Court of Appeals handled this challenge to a century-old Amendment as it should
have: by dismissing it. But the petitioner also made the claim that the conclusive
presumption of legal sufficiency espoused in Leser, Sprague, and Chandleris itself a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. And that, as
farfetched as it appears in a case challenging the Seventeenth Amendment, is
precisely the problem with the Court's Article V jurisprudence, as limited as it is.
Ironically, virtually every issue left open by these cases is raised by the ERA.
First, will the Court follow precedent in Hawke that the ERA has met the strict
formal requirements of ratification authorized by Article V? Second, will the
deadline be operative to cause the ERA to self-destruct, an issue not discussed in
Dillon and never yet presented? Third, may states change their minds and rescind
after ratification just as they may change their minds and ratify after rejection,
upsetting more than a century and a half of historical precedent? Fourth, who has
standing to challenge the ERA? 2 42 Fifth, may the Archivist refuse to certify the ERA
after having received the requisite number of state ratification certificates in
contradiction to the conclusory status of the state ratifications as dictated in Leser,
Sprague, and Chandler?Sixth, are any of these issues nonjusticiable political questions
left to Congress to resolve as hinted at by Coleman?
It is safe to say that our Supreme Court guideposts are about as helpful in
escaping the Article V wonderland as the advice of the Caterpillar or the White
Rabbit. But assuming we are ever to get out of the Article V maze, we should look
to traditional tools such as judicial norms, prior practice and precedents, original
intent, scholarly opinion, and canons of construction common with constitutional
disputes. Toward that end, therefore, I turn to our substantive issues of the deadline
and the rescissions briefly before returning to the beginning to determine what role,
if any, the Archivist has or should have in determining the legal sufficiency of
state ratifications.
III. MAKING OUR WAY OUT OF THE ARTICLE V WONDERLAND

Using the navigational tools of judicial interpretation, we can see that even if
we had clarity that the federal courts are the appropriate decision makers, we are
still left in a field of ambiguity when it comes to deciding whether Congress may
impose a deadline, whether ratifications after the deadline are valid, and whether
states may rescind their ratifications. Embracing that uncertainty, we can continue
on our ramble, like Alice, taking each adventure in stride.

242.
This is not an issue here exactly although, as I argue below, the Archivist should certify the
ERA and leave it up to a plaintiff with standing to challenge it. See infra Part IV. If the conclusiveness
issue were reversed, then anyone who is prosecuted pursuant to laws passed by virtue of the amendment
would have standing, as in the case of Dillon v. Gloss. 256 U.S. 368 (1921).
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A. CongressionalDeadlines
Despite the Court's statement in Dillon that deadlines might be a "matter of
detail" 243 within Congress's mode-of-ratification power, the real question behind
the deadline is whether Congress may impose a restriction on the states that would
have the effect of voiding an amendment that has met the technical requirements
of Article V. More specifically, to what extent may Congress use its proposal or
mode-of-ratification power to frustrate the states in the exercise of their ratification
power? This is a federalism question that is entirely unprecedented because the
deadline in Dillon did not actually operate in any way to void a state's ratification. 244
Analyzing the deadline issue requires, first and foremost, that we see it as a
limitation on the states' decision when, as well as whether, to ratify. The three states
that have ratified the ERA after the deadline have done so in opposition to a
congressional, not a state, limitation. It is unlikely that a state could even impose
such a deadline on its own ratification of constitutional proposals. The question
facing us is whether a congressional deadline is a mere matter of technical detail,
like the statute requiring certificates be sent to the Archivist, or a matter of
substance that infringes on the states' Article V powers and violates the federalism
balance of the Tenth Amendment. To unpack the answer to these questions, we
must use our traditional tools of constitutional interpretation.
1. Histoy and PriorPrecedent
The first deadline was imposed on the Eighteenth Amendment in an effort to
defeat it by then-Senator Warren Harding. 245 Although earlier efforts by opponents
to hamper amendment proposals by imposing deadlines had been suggested, they
ultimately failed. 246 And there was extensive debate at the time with strong opinions
that the deadline was unconstitutional. 247 When the Eighteenth Amendment passed

243.
Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 376 (1921).
244.
Seegeneraly id.
245.
In the height of controversy surrounding the Civil War Amendments, numerous attempts
had been made to stall the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments by limiting the time the states
could consider and ratify, by requiring intervening state legislative elections, and other roadblocks. See
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 2771 (May 23, 1866) (amendment of Sen. Buckalew adding an
intervening election, permitting no states to change their minds either way, and allowing only three
years to ratify); CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong. 3rd Sess. 912 (Feb. 5, 1869) (amendment adding an
intervening election requirement).
246.
Id.
247.
Senator Cummins explained:
I have no doubt whatever that if ratifications were to occur after the period of six years
named in the amendment of the Senator from Ohio the courts would either recognize those
ratifications or set aside the entire amendment, and the possible outcome of adopting the
amendment of the Senator from Ohio will be to plunge the whole subject into litigation that
may continue for years to come.
55 CONG. REC. 5652 (1917) (statement of Sen. Cummins). Senator Borah argued numerous times that
the deadline proposal was unconstitutional:
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in a little over a year, well within the seven-year deadline, opponents who wanted to
sink the proposal realized that it was a relatively ineffective strategy.248
Consequently, the Nineteenth Amendment and the Child Labor Amendment of
1924 were issued with no deadlines, although attempts were again made by
opponents to add deadlines along with other revisions to hinder or stall
their passage. 249
With the Twentieth Amendment, opponents again succeeded in placing a
deadline in the text of the proposal itself, hoping that the deadline would limit its
chances of being ratified in time. 250 Yet once again the deadline proved
ineffective.2 5 1 When the Twentieth Amendment was ratified in under twelve
months, members of Congress began to view the deadline as pro forma.25 2 The
Twenty-First and Twenty-Second Amendments both included a deadline in the text
of the proposals, and both were ratified relatively quickly.253
The Court's decision in Dillon helped prompt this reversal of fortune and, with
the Court's apparent imprimatur, deadlines became less controversial when added
to proposals. And if the amendment proposal was properly ratified and became
effective, then no harm, no foul. But if the proposal was not ratified within the
allotted time period, it was generally believed that the deadline would cause the
amendment to self-destruct.
But holding that an ineffective deadline would not void an otherwise properly
ratified amendment is far from holding that the deadline itself could stop the states
from exercising their sole ratification power under Article V after the date provided.
Complicating the issue even further is that, beginning in the 1960s, Congress moved

I have very grave doubts about whether or not this can be done. If this proposed
constitutional amendment goes to the States at the present time, as the Constitution of the
United States now stands the States have a right to ratify it within any time they may see fit.
The number of years within which they may take action is not limited.
55 CONG. REC. 5649 (1917) (statement of Sen. Borah).
248.
55 CONG. REC. 5649 (1917) (statement of Sen. Borah).
249.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; Child Labor Amendment H.R.J. Res. 184 (1924) (proposing a
constitutional amendment). A deadline, a requirement for state convention ratification, and other
efforts all failed. See KYVIG, supra note 6, at 236.
250.
U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 6. The Twentieth Amendment, although seemingly
commonplace to us, was quite controversial at the time because many in Congress felt that, with four
amendments having passed in the first two decades of the twentieth century, the country was on a
downhill slide toward using constitutional amendments to resolve substantive political differences. See
KYVIG, supranote 6, at 278.
251.
An earlier version of the Twentieth Amendment was subjected to an amendment to
include a deadline and a requirement that an intervening election take place before states could ratify it,
both with the apparent intent of making it harder to ratify. When that proposal failed to make it out of
the House, however, it died, to be replaced in the next Congress with an almost identical proposal that
retained the deadline but omitted the intervening election. By 1924 Congress had the benefit of the
Supreme Court's decision in Dillon v. Gloss, which held that the existence of a deadline did not void
the amendment, although whether an operative deadline could be valid was not raised, briefed, or
decided. KYVIG, supra note 6, at 273; Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921).
252.
Wright, supra note 13, at 66-68.
253. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, §3; U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, §2.
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the deadlines from the text of the proposal and into the preamble in order to remove
the deadline from the final text that would make its way into the Constitution. 254
The Twenty-Third through the Twenty-Sixth Amendments all included seven-year
deadlines in the preamble, or resolving clause, as did the ERA proposal. 255 But as
debate over the ERA extension grew, Congress opted to place the deadline for the
D.C. Representation Amendment back into the text, where many believed it would
not be amendable by a later Congress. 25 6 These congressional turnabouts could lead
one to reasonably conclude that deadlines in the preamble function differently than
deadlines in the text. 257
Until the ERA timed out, no deadline has ever been legally operative. Every
amendment proposal that was issued from Congress containing a deadline was
ratified under the time limit. Of the two amendment proposals that did not contain
a deadline, one passed relatively quickly and became the Nineteenth Amendment
and the other, the Child Labor Amendment, has still failed to pass. And until
January 27, 2020, the deadline in the ERA was inoperative as fewer than thirty-eight
states had ratified. Any challenge to the deadline in a ratified amendment would fail
under the reasoning of Dillon, and any challenge to the deadline in an unratified
amendment proposal would fail on ripeness grounds. Thus, only now have we
reached a triable issue on the constitutionality of the congressional deadline, and we
should follow our constitutional guideposts to see if we can get out of the deadline
maze without feeling like we are running circles in a Caucus-race.

2. Textualism
The Court's commitment to textualism in all of its prior Article V cases is
incontrovertible. 258 Ratifications and proposals that meet the plain language of
Article V have been upheld against substantive and procedural challenges. But of
course, Article V makes no explicit mention of a deadline or the power to impose
deadlines in the text of an amendment itself. 259 If there is any power to impose a
deadline on the states, that power must be implied either from the power to propose
amendments or the power to specify the mode of ratification. The inclusion of time

254.
KYVIG, supranote 6, at 468.
255.
Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment, supra note 8, at 20-21.
256.
Id.
257.
Hanlon, supra note 15, at 694-95; Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 923; Held,
Hemdon & Stager, supra note 15, at 123-28.
258.
The Supreme Court has held that Article V should be read for its plain language and plain
meaning. In United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731-32 (1931), the Court explained that
[t]he Constitution['s] ... words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as
distinguished from technical meaning; where the intention is clear there is no room for
construction and no excuse for interpolation or addition .... The fact that an instrument
drawn with such meticulous care and by men who so well understood how to make language
fit their thought does not contain any such limiting phrase . . is persuasive evidence that
no qualification was intended.
259.
Id.
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periods and restrictions in other parts of the Constitution, including within Article
V itself, suggests that the omission of such a deadline for the ratification of
constitutional amendments was intentional.260 The lack of an explicit deadline
power in Article V and the inclusion of deadlines elsewhere support the conclusion
that the Framers did not intend to grant such a power to Congress. Senator
Brandegee insisted that the provision of Article V, providing that an amendment
shall be deemed valid "when ratified," means "whenever ratified." 26 1
That Congress does not have the power to subvert the ratification function of
the states was the view of Senator Borah, who objected to the deadline in the
Eighteenth Amendment, stating:
We having submitted [it] to the States, it is in the possession of the States,
and we cannot control it. They have a perfect right to say, 'we shall ratify
this now,' or 'We shall ratify it in 10 years from now,' and when they shall
ratify it they will have acted in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution of the United States. 262
Furthermore, there is no express provision to imply the power to impose
deadlines in Article V, such as the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article 1.263
Although Congress has the power to choose the mode of ratification, the two
choices facing Congress in making that decision are clearly articulated: state
legislatures or state conventions. The power to qualify or to expound on that
decision is nowhere granted. And the Supreme Court has held that any other modes
or limitations are unconstitutional, such as a public referendum or the requirement
of an intervening election,264 regardless of whether they are appended by the states
or by Congress. 265 In the absence of any express power or language granting implied
powers to impose additional conditions or regulations on the mode of ratification,
Sprague's admonition makes sense, that we should not add words to the plain text
or construe and interpolate additional powers, 266 especially when those powers can
substantially frustrate the ratification power granted solely to the states.

260.
For instance, Article V specifies that "no amendment which may be made prior to the year
one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the
ninth section of the first article." U.S. CONST. art. V. Article I, Section 2 provides that representatives
be elected every second year and the census be taken within every ten-year period following the first
census. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. Article I, Section 5 states that neither house of Congress may adjourn
for more than three days without the consent of the other. Id. at § 5. Article I, Section 7 states that the
President has ten days, notwithstanding Sundays, within which he may sign or veto a bill that has been
presented to him. Id. at § 7.
261.
55 CONG. REC. 5650 (1917) (statement of Sen. Brandegee) ("The Constitution itself,
therefore, provides that an amendment shall be ratified when approved by the legislatures of
three-fourths of the States; and I think there is no question that the word 'when' always has been
interpreted, and is correctly interpreted, as though it were 'whenever."').
262.
55 CONG. REC. 5649 (1917) (statement of Sen. Borah).
263.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
264.
Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227-30 (1920).
265.
KYVIG, supa note 6, at 181, 251, 273.
266.
United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1930).
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3. Orjginalism
The history of the drafting of Article V, and of the Constitution generally, also
supports the view that Congress does not have the power to limit the time during
which the states can exercise their sole ratification power. Original drafts did not
include any role for Congress in amending the Constitution. The Virginia Plan
provided that amendments would originate only with the states and would not
require any congressional participation. 267 The concern of many of the drafters was
that the national legislature would erect barriers to any amendments intended to
limit its power. Maintaining the federal/state balance justified giving sole
amendment power to the states. 268 This was consistent with the Framers' general
beliefs that an unrestrained federal government would tend to amass greater and
greater power at the expense of the states. 269
Alexander Hamilton was concerned, however, that the states might be out of
touch with the needs of the federal government and might not be inclined to grant
additional powers in cases of great national need. 270 Roger Sherman, voicing
Hamilton's concerns that the states alone should not have sole proposing power,
suggested adding the provision allowing for congressional proposal of amendments
but kept Congress's role limited only to proposing.271 Thus, Congress was given the
ability to make proposals, but no changes were made to the sole primacy of the
states in the ratification process.2 72 Even after Congress was granted the power to
propose amendments along with the states, Hamilton affirmed the primacy of the
states: "The words of this article are peremptory. The Congress 'shall call a
convention.' Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of that body .... We
may safely rely on the disposition of the state legislatures to erect barriers against
273
the encroachments of the national authority."
The states are both necessary and sufficient parties to an amendment because
they have the ability to propose amendments without consent of the national
legislature through conventions and then ratify them. At the same time, Congress
has only a limited, potentially ministerial, role. If Congress, with its limited power,
could substantially impair the states' exercise of their constitutional function by
dictating when or how they are to ratify, the federal/state balance envisioned by the
drafters would be fundamentally undermined. 274

KYVIG, supra note 6, at 56-60.
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMER'S COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 539 (2016).
269.
Id. at 592-93.
267.
268.

270.

Id. at 539.

271.

KYVIG, supranote 6, at 57.

272.

Id. at 57-58.

273.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton).
274.
Had the drafters envisioned congressional power to limit the states to ratifying within a
specified time period, they would surely have mentioned it, since leaving that decision to congressional
discretion might allow Congress to frustrate the will of the states by allowing only a very short time in
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4. Logic
Senator Brandegee's complaint that the deadline was a paradoxical
impossibility makes sense in the context of deadlines in the text of the amendment
itself.275 But the ERA deadline is in the preamble and could, perhaps, logically be
imposed as a technical detail under Congress's mode-of-ratification power. But we
face both a substantive and a procedural paradox again. The substantive paradox
assumes that seven years is a reasonable time, and the procedural paradox assumes
that matters of procedural detail could be left to Congress, rather than to the states.
On the substantive side, a deadline of six years 276 might seem reasonable in
theory but could be virtually impossible to satisfy in practice if legislatures met only
quadrennially, as was the case in some states until quite recently.2 77 And of course,
with no textual parameters to frame such a deadline power, arguably there would
be no constraints on Congress imposing a short deadline of one year, or even one
month, on the states. Arguments that a "reasonable time period" must be provided,
or that there is some element of contemporaneousness between proposal and
ratification, ask the courts to substitute their judgment for that of the states, the
parties tasked with determining when an amendment is necessary.
It would seem that the ratification of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment has
exploded the myth of contemporaneousness, and the fact that Congress sat on the
ERA proposal for more years than the states have makes a seven-year deadline
coming from Congress a bit Janus-faced. Seven years provide sufficient time for
ratification in thirty-eight states only if there is bipartisan support for an amendment
or if the states are sufficiently gerrymandered to ensure that the political party that
supports an amendment also controls the requisite number of state houses.
Gerrymandering the other way, in only thirteen states, is enough to block a popular
amendment proposal well past the expiration date allowed by Congress. Although

which to ratify a proposal, especially if it was a proposal initiated by the states and not by Congress.
KYVIG, supra note 6, at 60 ("Like the rest of their creation, Article V evinced the essential compromise
struck between the proponents of a strong central government and the advocates of retained state
power. Although Congress was granted a powerful role in the process, constitutional ratification and
amendment were not to be achieved solely by the central government, nor merely with the concurrence
of some majority of an undifferentiated national population. States, as distinct entities with separate
populations and political institutions, occupied as significant and unavoidable a position in the process
as did the national government; majorities in the legislatures or conventions of individual states
would decide constitutional issues. The possibility of the states in concert initiating constitutional
change as well as checking congressionally initiated reform were notable characteristics of the
amending system.").
275.
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
276.
Senator Harding's original deadline was just six years. 55 CONG. REC. 5648 (1917). It was
later changed to seven in the House. Deadlines of from three to twenty years have, at various times,
been suggested. See Congressional Pay Amendment, supra note 34, at 89.
277.

See

ROBERT

LUCE,

LEGISLATIVE

ASSEMBLIES:

THEIR

CHARACTER, CHARACTERISTICS, HABITS, AND MANNERS 25 (1924)

FRAMEWORK, MAKE-UP,
(noting that Alabama and

Mississippi had quadrennial sessions and Maryland had triennial sessions, with a shift around the turn
of the twentieth century to lengthen the period between sessions).
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seven years might have seemed reasonable to Justice Van Devanter in 1921, it seems
far less reasonable today when state houses reflect deeply entrenched political
interests that do not reflect the popular will. As Justice Breyer stated in Vieth
v. Jubilerer,it could take decades to get out from under a powerful gerrymander, and
by that time the seven-year deadline could have come and gone many times over.278
With redistricting happening after each decennial census, it could take decades for
a heavily gerrymandered legislature to be dislodged to allow popular support for an
amendment to be reflected. As a matter of simple politics, a deadline designed to
subvert and prevent an amendment proposal's ratification should be viewed in the
clear light as an attempt to gain political points while ensuring that no changes
occur. 279 Although such behavior is eminently reasonable in the world of partisan
politics, it seems patently unreasonable in the realm of constitutional interpretation.
As a procedural matter, deadlines too are illogical, even when located in the
preamble. Although they do not cause an amendment proposal to self-destruct, like
deadlines in the text, they pose a different paradox. On the basis of what authority
or power would a deadline operate? The Court has held that preambles are
nonbinding. Justice Scalia in District of Columbia v. Heller stated explicitly that only
the operative words of a constitutional provision are legally binding: "The Second
Amendment is naturally divided into two parts: its prefatory clause and its operative
clause. The former does not limit the latter grammatically, but rather announces a
purpose .... But apart from that clarifying function, a prefatory clause does not
limit or expand the scope of the operative clause." 280 On this understanding,
preambles may clarify but generally do not limit or bind and have no legally
operative effect.
Some Senators during debate of the Eighteenth Amendment argued that the
deadline acted like a condition in a contract. 281 Congress could offer the states an
unlimited time to ratify, or it could offer them a shortened time to ratify: kind of a
"clearance sale," a time-limited chance to get an amendment. But like the Cheshire
Cat, the condition argument reveals its true stripes upon further reflection. For
states that are ready to buy now, the deadline is irrelevant. For states that never want
to buy, the deadline is also irrelevant. But for states that cannot, or perhaps do not,
want to buy now but might want to later, the deadline is a serious constraint on their
Article V powers to ratify after rejecting, a power expressly affirmed in Coleman and

278.
541 U.S. 267, 364 (2004). Justice Breyer explains in his dissent in Vieth that "[t]he
combination of increasingly precise map-drawing technology and increasingly frequent map drawing
means that a party may be able to bring about a gerrymander that is not only precise, but virtually
impossible to dislodge." Id.
279.
This was clearly Senator Harding's goal. See Wright, supra note 13, at 64-65 and
accompanying citations.
280.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577-78 (2008).
281.
55 CONG. REC. 5650 (1917) (statement of Sen. Pomerene) ("I know of nothing in the
Constitution which says that the Congress can not attach any condition or qualification to a proposition
which it submits in the form of a proposed amendment to the Constitution.")
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Chandler. Those cases provide that states may change their minds and ratify after
they have rejected. 282 But a congressional deadline provides that the state that might
want to change its mind may only do so within seven years. After that, its Article V
power to change its mind is foreclosed.
But why, you might ask, didn't states object to one of the eight prior instances
in which the deadline had been imposed? In no case has a state's decision to change
its mind mattered until the Illinois, Nevada, and Virginia ratifications of the ERA
because this was the only time yet that a state had asserted its rights to change its
mind and ratify after the deadline and those ratifications would be legally significant
in the absence of the deadline. Yet, it should be noted that numerous states have
exercised their power to change their minds and have ratified amendments after the
deadline has passed.283 And in all of these instances, these states are listed as ratifying
states even though they changed their minds and ratified many years after the
congressional deadline had passed. But these late ratifications, although recognized
as valid, ultimately did not matter because the requisite number of other states had
already ratified, and the amendments had already become effective. But that should
not be taken to mean that the states that ratified before the deadline expired, or
those that ratified after the amendment had become effective, consented to
Congress limiting the time in which they could change their mind and choose to
ratify after rejecting. 284 Those states simply had no reason to object.

5. Scholary Opinion
Lawmakers and legal scholars in the past also agreed that deadlines were
inconsistent with the states' ratifying power and were unconstitutional. Justice Story

282.
Seegeneral/y Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); Chandler v. Wise, 307 U.S. 474 (1939).
283.
Alabama ratified the Twenty-Third Amendment forty-two years after it was
proposed. See Ratfication of Constitutional Amendments, U.S. CONST. (Nov. 11, 2010), https://
www.usconstitution.net/constamrat.html [https://penna.cc/H84Q-KNZH]. Virginia, North Carolina,
Alabama, and Texas ratified the Twenty-Fourth Amendment fifteen, twenty-seven, forty, and
forty-seven years, respectively, after that amendment was proposed. See Bill McAllister & Megan
Rosenfeld, Va. On Amendments: No!, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 1977), https:/ /www.washingtonpost.com
/archive/politics/1977/02/24/va-on-amendments-no/57623fcd-f270-47cc-ad9b-7bfdb4134e59/?tid=ssmail
[https://perma.cc/5DX9-U2GN]; H.R. JOURNAL, 1989 Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. 542 (N.C.);
H.R. Journal, 2002 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ala.); Jena Williams, Righting a Wrong, TEX. MONTHLY
[https://perma.cc/YEA2(June 2009), https://www.texasmonthly.com/articles/rghting-a-wrong/
Q73A]. South Dakota ratified the Twenty-Sixth Amendment forty-three years after it was proposed.
See, e.g., Caheidelberger, SJR 1: 43 Years Later, South Dakota to Rath Vote for 18-year-Olds,
S. D. MADVILLE TIMES, (Jan. 24, 2014), https:/ /madvilletimes.com/2014/01/24/sjr-1-43-years-latersouth-dakota-to-ratify-vote-for-18-year-olds/
[https://perma.cc/4FJA-QA8Y]; GOV'T PUBL'G
OFF., AMENDMENTS, supra note 48. Gabriel Chin views these post-adoption ratifications as
symbolically important. See Gabriel J. Chin & Anjali Abraham, Beyond the Supermajority: Post-Adoption
Ratification of the EqualityAmendments, 50 ARiz. L. REV. 25, 33-37 (2008).
284.
Where the states ratified, presumably they would have no standing to challenge the
deadline, and where they ratified after the deadline but the amendment was already effective, their
challenge would be moot.
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interpreted Article V to permit an unlimited time for states to deliberate. 285 David
Watson, in his 1910 treatise on the history of the Constitution, even before the first
deadline was successfully imposed on an amendment proposal, explained that
The Constitution does not prescribe a time in which the States may ratify
an amendment. Such a provision might have been regarded as an attempt
to force the States into a ratification, whereas it was the desire of the
Convention that the action of the States should be deliberate and free
from influence. 286
Watson went on to explain
Who but the State can judge of what would be a reasonable time? It is for
the State to ratify and cannot the State take its own time to do it? What
branch of the government can tell a State when it must ratify an
amendment in the absence of any constitutional provision of the subject?
The question may someday become of great importance. 287
More recent scholars have argued that deadlines violate the Article V function
and the federalism balance. Mason Kalfus, analyzing the history and text of Article
V, concluded that any and all deadlines are unconstitutional. 288 I have concluded
the same in an earlier article. 289 Michael Hanlon concluded that deadlines might be
a good idea, but to effectuate them a constitutional amendment would be
necessary.2 90 Walter Dellinger, in an influential article in the HarvardLaw Review in
1983, noted that time limits in the text might be permissible, but not in the resolving

285. Justice Story stated:
The guards [in Article V] against the too hasty exercise of the [amendment] power, . .. are
apparently sufficient. Two thirds of congress, or of the legislatures of the states, must concur
in proposing, or requiring amendments to be proposed; and three fourths of the states must
ratify them. Time is thus allowed, and ample time, for deliberation, both in proposing and
ratifying amendments. They cannot be carried by surprise, or intrigue, or artifice. Indeed,
years may elapse before a deliberate judgment may be passed upon them, unless some
pressing emergency calls for instant action.
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 688 (Melville
M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed. 1905).
286.
DAVID K. WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY
APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION 1310-11 (1910). Although no deadline had been successfully
appended to an amendment proposal when Watson wrote this, at least two attempts had been made in
relation to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Earlier efforts to impose deadlines, as well as
impose other barriers, had also been rejected by Congress. In 1866, Senator Buckalew offered a
three-year deadline on the Fourteenth Amendment proposal, which was ultimately rejected. See
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2771 (1866) (proposing an amendment of Sen. Buckalew to add
an intervening election, permit no states to change their minds either way, and allow only three years to
ratify). And in 1869, Senator Buckalew again offered an amendment to the Fifteenth Amendment
proposal to require intervening election of state legislators. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3rd
Sess. 912 (1869) (proposing an amendment adding an intervening election requirement). Senators
viewed these revisions as motivated by a desire to frustrate the amendments' ratification and as
procedural barriers that were likely unconstitutional. See WATSON, supra note 186, at 1310-11.
287.
WATSON, supra note 286, at 1311-12.
288.
Kalfus, supra note 15, at 467.
289.
Wright, supra note 13, at 46.
290.
Hanlon, supra note 15, at 678-79.
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clause.2 9 1 Michael Stokes Paulsen rejected the idea that there is an implied
requirement that amendments be ratified within some reasonable period in order
to ensure contemporaneity. 292 Jean Witter concluded that "Dillon was not
dispositive of the validity of a time limit as an integral part of an amendment. The
case has even less value regarding validity of a time limit in a resolving clause." 293
Brendon Ishikawa argued that Madison's "argument that a constitutional text may
not be conditionally accepted seems as applicable in the context of a time condition
as it does in the context of rescission of a state's earlier ratification." 2 94 Ishikawa
noted that time limits allow the federal government to engage in self-dealing,
especially in the convention context, but also in the context of congressional
proposals. 295 A time limit allows congressmen to gain the political benefits of voting
in favor of popular amendment proposals but ensuring that they will fail. Richard
Albert came to the same conclusion: that time limits increase the risk of
political brinksmanship. 296
And of course, David Watson, well before any successful deadline had been
appended, stated in 1910 that no political entity could tell the states when or whether
to ratify an amendment.297 But perhaps David Kyvig put it most clearly:
Article V specified no time limit on ratification of a constitutional
amendment by the states. The drafters of Article V left no evidence that
they thought in terms of restricting the rights of states to endorse at any
time a constitutional change approved by Congress. The sovereign right of
the people to sanction constitutional change through the agency of a state
legislature or convention was fundamental and unqualified. Before Warren
Harding's 1917 attempt to derail the national prohibition amendment, no
amendment that Congress proposed ever contained any limitation. The
ratification time-limit issue arose only because clever politicians sought, in
effect, to vote both yes and no on constitutional change. The stratagem
was shrewd in theory but disastrous in practice, judged not only by the
failure of Harding's maneuver but also by the subsequent role of time-limit
considerations in distracting attention from the substance of proposals
such as the child labor and District of Columbia representation
amendment and, above all, the equal rights amendment. 298

291.
Dellinger, supranote 15, at 425. ("The text of article V places no time limit on ratifications,
but if Congress wishes to limit the time within which an amendment may be considered, it may do so
by placing a limit within the text of the proposed amendment. When Congress does not act in this
fashion, the time for ratification is simply not limited by article V.").
292.
Paulsen, supra note 18, at 690-91.
293.
Witter, supranote 17, at 218.
294.
Ishikawa, supra note 9, at 580.
295.
Id. at 581.
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A cursory analysis of the deadline issue reminds us that we are in Alice's
Wonderland, for if the Court follows prior precedent and treats certificates as
conclusive, then the late ERA ratifications should be deemed valid and the textualist
in all of us can feel relieved. Federalism and originalism both support such an
outcome. But if the Court simply punts on the issue once again, relying on the
conclusory nature of the certificates, there is no resolution for future cases and the
victory is pyrrhic. As with the Progressive Era cases, the decision would have little
precedential value, and we would continue to wander in our Article V wonderland.
On the other hand, if the Court follows the dicta in Dillon, then it must decide if
the seven years are inherently reasonable. If it says they are, it will be opening the
door to Congress imposing greater and greater constraints on the states, such as a
popular referendum, an intervening election, or any other procedural barrier. The
real problem with a holding in favor of the deadline, however, is that it will cause
the ERA to be voided, even though it has met the technical requirements of Article
V. That has never happened before, as the Court has always erred on the side of
affirming ratifications and amendments that have met the straightforward
requirements of Article V.
Ruling in favor of Congress's power to impose a deadline goes against logic,
textualism, originalism, history, andprecedentif thatprecedentis Leser, Sprague, and
Chandler. It is only marginally consistent with precedent in Dillon if the Court
upholds the deadline because the Dillon precedent is in dicta and would result in the
opposite outcome, an outcome the Court has consistently avoided in the past. To
get us out of our Article V web of uncertainty, we need the Court to reject its
conclusory presumption of legal sufficiency; address the deadline on the merits and
see it for what it is, which is an infringement of the states' sole power to control the
ratification function; overrule Dillon to the extent Dillon is inconsistent (which I
have argued it isn't necessarily 299); and articulate the federalism issue at the heart of
the deadline.
The paradox of the deadline is that the Court must overrule its precedent that
purportedly supports the deadline but also overrule its precedents that ratification
certificates are conclusive on the courts. Any other decision leaves us running in
circles because following Dillon means voiding an otherwise properly ratified
amendment and following Leser, Sprague, and Chandler means allowing arbitrary
factors, like whether the state govemor acted quickly and sent a ratification
certificate in promptly, to prevail over legally important questions of whether states
have actually violated Article V in their ratification procedures.

299.
See Wright, supm note 13, at 70-74. I argued Dillon is wrong and should be overruled on
federalism grounds generally, because Congress does not have the authority to impose a deadline on
the states. But in the alternative, I also argued that Dillon is not inconsistent with the ERA deadline
because it is inapposite. Dillon involved a deadline in the text while the ERA deadline is in the
preamble. Id.
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B. Rescissions
Not surprisingly, our adventures through Article V, which conclude that the
Court should reverse virtually all of its prior precedents (or at least distinguish
them), are not at an end. The issue of state rescissions does not raise federalism
concerns, but it does raise profound questions about the ability of states to frustrate
the Article V ratification powers of other states. And the real puzzle here concerns
the reliance interests of later-ratifying states on the solidity of the ratifications of
earlier states. But we can work our way through the rescission issue the same way
we did through the deadline issue, by using our traditional tools of constitutional
construction to find a path out of the Article V maze.

1. PriorPractice and Histoy
As noted earlier, there were attempts to rescind the Fourteenth Amendment
(Ohio and New Jersey), the Fifteenth Amendment (New York), and the Nineteenth
Amendment (Tennessee), but none have been recognized as valid, and all four states
have been listed as having ratified the relevant amendments.300 The five rescissions
of the ERA are different, however; the former Amendments were all ultimately
ratified by additional states so that their validity made no difference.
Despite the fact that there have been a handful of attempted rescissions, the
general understanding by politicians is that rescissions were ineffective. Senator
Roscoe Conkling in 1870 opined that rescissions were impermissible, as did
Representative Harold Volkmer a century later.30 1 Congressman Garrett, in 1925,
stated that "it is generally regarded to be . . . the law that a State . . . may not
reconsider and change a ratification." 30 2 And a Senate Report of 1973 concluded
that "Congress previously has taken the position that having once ratified an
amendment, a State may not rescind." 30 3 The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine came
to the conclusion that rescissions were impermissible in an opinion issued
responding to a question by the Govemor in 1919.304 Governor Ward ofNewJersey
vetoed the New Jersey rescission of the Fourteenth Amendment on the grounds
that "New Jersey's initial 1867 endorsement had completed the amending process
and bound the state to a federal contract." 305 When Kentucky's legislature brought
a resolution to rescind its prior ratification of the ERA, the interim Governor,
Thelma Stovall, vetoed the resolution, stating the rescission resolution was invalid

Supra note 48.

300.

See GOVT PUBL'G OFF., AMENDMENTS,

301.
302.

CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong, 2d Sess. 1477 (1870); 124 CONG. REC. 5261, 5270 (1978).
66 CONG. REC. 2119, 2159 (1925) (remarks of Rep. Garrett).

303.
304.
305.

S. REP. NO. 93-293, at 14 (1973).
In re Opinion of the justices, 107 A. 673, 675 (Me. 1919).
KYVIG, supra note 6, at 174.
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because once a legislature has voted to ratify an amendment, it is final. 306 The
Kentucky decision follows the longstanding precedent set when, in 1865, the
Kentucky Governor also determined that rescissions were impermissible. 3 7 Later,
the Supreme Courts of Kentucky and Kansas also rejected the validity of rescission
after ratification in dicta. 308 No state rescission has ever been given legal effect.

2. Textualism
From a textualist perspective it makes sense that rescissions are ineffective.
Article V does not mention rescissions, only ratifications, and there is no implied
power to rescind. Efforts to permit rescissions have all failed. Senator James
Wadsworth of New York and Representative Finis Garrett of Tennessee proposed
an amendment to Article V that would have permitted rescissions in 1921, but the
proposal failed to get the requisite two-thirds support of Congress. 30 9 Senator Sam
Ervin proposed legislation in 1971 that would have permitted rescissions, but it too
failed. 310 During the ERA extension debates, other bills to permit rescissions were
proposed but also failed.31 1
There is a suggestion that an 1866 proposal to prohibit rescissions implies that
rescissions were permitted, 312 but within twenty years the reverse became the
consensus. Judge Jameson, expressing the prevailing view of the late nineteenth
century in 1887, and the view that continues to prevail today, stated
The power of a State legislature to participate in amending the
Federal Constitution exists only by virtue of a special grant in that
Constitution .... So, when the State legislature has done the act or thing
which the power contemplated and authorized-when power [to ratify]
has been exercised-it, ipso facto, ceases to exist.3 1 3

306.
Livingston Taylor, ERA Rescission Vetoed in Kentucky, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 1978),
https:/ /www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/ 1978/03/21/era-rescission-vetoed-in-kentucky
/b6a72232-f433-40b5-b2be-ddd23914e204/ [https://perma.cc/XXC7-2JRT].
307.

See JOHN ALEXANDER JAMESON, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS;

THEIR HISTORY, POWERS, AND MODES OF PROCEEDING § 581 (4th ed. 1887) (quoting the message

of Governor Bramlette).
308.
Wise v. Chandler, 108 S.W.2d 1024,1033 (Ky. 1937) ("[A] State can act but once ... upon
a proposed amendment; and, whether its vote be in the affirmative or be negative, having acted, it has
exhausted its power further to consider the question without a resubmission by Congress."); Coleman
v. Miller, 71 P.2d 518, 524 (Kan. 1937) ("[A] ratification once given cannot be withdrawn."), affd, 307
U.S. 433 (1939).
309.
KYVIG supranote 6, at 251-53.
310.
S. 215, 92d Cong. (1971).
311.
The Railsback and the Gan Amendments were both defeated. See 124 CONG. REC. H., D704
(daily ed. Aug. 15, 1978); 124 CONG. REC. S., D860 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1978).
312.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 2760, 2771 (1866) (amendment of Sen. Buckalew to
add an intervening election, permit no states to change their minds either way, and allow only three
years to ratify).
313.
JAMESON, supra note 307, at 631-32.
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The Supreme Court in Coleman noted that Article V only refers to ratifications, that
rescissions are nowhere mentioned. The Court concludes from this evidence that
without something more (congressional legislation or constitutional amendment),
rescissions are unavailing. 314
With no textual commitment to the power to rescind and the historical
practice that has rejected state rescissions, the logical conclusion is that rescissions
are ineffective. And that position was taken by the Office of Legal Counsel in a
Memorandum to Congress during the ERA extension debates. 315
3. Orjginalism
The rescission question may also be illuminated with reference to the debates
and considerations of the framers. Most notably, in considering the question
whether states could conditionally ratify the constitution, James Madison replied
with an emphatic no. In discussing whether New York could conditionally ratify the
new constitution, he explained
My opinion is that a reservation of a right to withdraw if amendments be
not decided on under the form of the Constitution within a certain time, is
a conditionalratification, that it does not make N. York a member of the
New Union, and consequently that she could not be received on that plan.
Compacts must be reciprocal, this principle would not in such a case be
preserved. The Constitution requires an adoption in toto, andfor ever. It has
been so adopted by the other States. An adoption for a limited time would
be as defective as an adoption of some of the articles only.316
To get the new constitution ratified, Madison realized it was fundamentally
important that states not be given the power to condition their ratifications on the
actions of other states or on inclusion of a bill of rights; ratification needed to
provide certainty for subsequent states engaging in the deeply consequential process
of adopting a new constitution. Because ratification is the only legally effective act
recognized in Article V, implying a power to rescind would seem to go against the
principles of constitutionalism by undermining the methodical step-by-step process
of achieving consensus. The Framers viewed ratification of the Constitution as a
simple, unconditional acceptance with no take backs, and there is no evidence that
they wanted to treat amendments differently.
This need for certainty is perhaps the most important aspect of ratification,
and it is more important today than it was in 1787, as the number of states and their

314.

"Article V, speaking solely of ratifications, contains no provision as to rejection." Coleman

v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 450 (1939).
315.
See Power of a State Legislature to Rescind its Ratification of a Constitutional Amendment,
supra note 158.
316.
Letter from James Madison to Alexander Hamilton, (July 20, 1788) (on file with Founders
Online) https://founders.archives.gov/?q=Volume%3AHamilton-01-05&s=1511311112&r=97
[https://perma.cc/PH75-7CCC].
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populations and political views are more diverse. With greater political, economic,
social, and cultural pressures facing state legislatures, they need to feel confident
about the status of an amendment proposal before they expend the political capital
and scarce legislative time to consider ratifying a proposed amendment. If a state
legislature believes that its ratification effort will put an amendment over the line, it
would be intolerable if an earlier ratifying state could rescind just as another state's
legislature is involved in the complex politics of ratifying. For what state legislature
would expend the political resources to ratify if it could not rely on the stability of
earlier ratifications? And what state would ratify a constitution containing an
amendment procedure that would allow for ever-changing positions on
constitutional structures and procedures?
Richard Bernstein and Jerome Agel explain:
[T]he prevailing view is that the amending process may be understood as
working in only one direction. Once a state rejects an amendment, it is free
to reconsider and ratify it; however, once a state ratifies an amendment, it
may not rescind that ratification. Why should this be the case? A state's
decision to adopt an amendment forms the basis for later states' decision
to adopt or to reject. To permit rescission of a ratification would be to
confuse and perhaps derail the amending process's orderly functioning. By
contrast, if a state reconsiders its rejection of an amendment, its action
does not undercut the basis for later states' decisions. A state should be
free to change its mind about rejecting an amendment if other states'
actions demonstrate that the amendment has general popular support. 317
When we consider Madison's rejection of conditional ratifications, and the
textual absence of a power to rescind or any language that implies such a power, the
prevailing view that rescissions are impermissible makes sense. As Professor
William Van Alstyne put it, allowing rescissions would be "an atrocious way to run
a constitution." 318 And Judge Jameson reasoned that if the Framers had intended to
permit rescissions, Article V would read
[T]hat the amendment should be valid "when ratified by the legislatures
of three-fourths of the States, each adhering to its vote until three-fourths
of all the legislatures should have voted to ratify." It is enough to say that
such is not the language of the Constitution; but that it shall be valid when
3 19
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the States.
The Framers viewed ratification as an up or down vote of assent, and the disruptive
nature of rescission would destabilize this all-important process.

317.

BERNSTEIN & AGEL, supra note 14, at 254.

318. Joint Resolution Extending the Deadline for the Ratification of the Equal Rights
Amendment: Hearing on H.J. Res. 638 Before the Subcomm. on Civ. and Const. Rts. of the Comm. on the
Judiciaryof the H.R., 95th Cong. 138 (1977-1978) (testimony of Prof Van Alstyne).
319.

JAMESON, supra note 307, at 632.
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4. Logic
If we have learned anything in our adventures through the Article V
wonderland, it is that riddles abound, and paradoxes rule the day. To the extent
Article V leaves a wide amount of discretion for the states to determine when and
how they will ratify, what is the harm in allowing them to rescind as well? For isn't
that an affirmation of the primary role of the states in the amendment process? The
problem, however, is that the primacy of the states is a fundamental principle of
federalism that helps define the boundary between Congress's Article V powers and
the states' Article V powers. That principle does not prevail, however, when we are
considering rescissions because those affect the relations between the states. Thus,
rescission is really a question of whether a state that has ratified, and upon whose
ratification other states are relying in their decision whether to engage in ratification
proceedings, may rescind just when it looks like another state is about to ratify and
put the amendment over the threshold. Rescissions essentially involve some states
utilizing their Article V discretionary powers to undermine the actions of other
states. And that is a fundamentally different issue than the issue of congressional
deadlines or congressionally mandated procedures.
Despite the fact that no state rescission has been given effect, rescissions are
simply unreasonable in the profoundly heady realm of constitution-making because
allowing recissions would undermine the ratification process and go against the
plain language outlined by Article V. Unlike legislation, that can be amended and
revoked at any time, constitutional amendments may not be revoked unless they are
repealed through the same process that got us the amendment in the first place. It
is an accepted part of the law-making process that a current Congress may not bind
future Congresses. But constitutions operate differently. Allowing the political
shenanigans of the legislative process to invade the sphere of constitutionalism
would be an unwise decision, especially with the deeply partisan divide we are seeing
in today's Congress and state houses.
Much more can be expounded on the issue of rescissions, but we must keep
our end goal in sight. If we want an Article V process that is not too unwieldy or
does not impose more roadblocks than the supermajorities Article V already
requires, then we need to think critically about what benefit accrues from allowing
states to rescind. Like the tardy ratifications of the Child Labor Amendment and
the ERA, post-rejection ratifications and post-ratification rescissions allow states
to reflect the changing views of their people. But post-rejection ratifications do not
impact the decisions or acts of other states. Post-ratification rescissions do. By
destabilizing the ratification process and creating uncertainty for other states,
rescissions threaten the very heart of Article V's finely wrought procedure. As
Justice Marshall explained in M'Culloch v. Mayland, it is not acceptable for the
government of one state to undermine the interests of the people of other states.
If any one proposition could command the universal assent of mankind,
we might expect it would be this-that the government of the Union,
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though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action. This
would seem to result, necessarily, from its nature. It is the government of
all; its powers are delegated by all; it represents all, and acts for all. Though
any one state may be willing to control its operations, no state is willing to
allow others to control them.
... Would the people of any one state trust those of another with a power
to control the most insignificant operations of their state government? We
know they would not. Why, then, should we suppose, that the people of
any one state should be willing to trust those of another with a power to
control the operations of a government to which they have confided their
most important and most valuable interests? In the legislature of the Union
alone, are all represented. The legislature of the Union alone, therefore, can
be trusted by the people with the power of controlling measures which
concern all, in the confidence that it will not be abused. This, then, is not
a case of confidence, and we must consider it is as it really is.
... The people of all the states have created the general government, and
have conferred upon it the general power of taxation .... But when a State
taxes the operations of the government of the United States, it acts upon
institutions created, not by their own constituents, but by people over
whom they claim no control. It acts upon the measures of a government
created by others as well as themselves, for the benefit of others in
common with themselves. The difference is that which always exists, and
always must exist, between the action of the whole on a part, and the action
of a part on the whole-between the laws of a government declared to be
supreme, and those of a government which, when in opposition to those
laws, is not supreme. 320
This principle, expounded so early in our national history, explains why states
should not be permitted to rescind, for their actions undermine the constitutional
participation of other states.
Finally, we must return to where we began, with the executive official who
proclaims the validity of a new amendment: the Archivist. For only through him
may we be able to get out of our Article V wonderland with the ERA intact.
IV. ROLE OF THE NATIONAL ARCHIVIST

Federal legislation provides that the Archivist, formerly the Secretary of State,
has the duty to publish a constitutional amendment once it has been ratified by the
required number of states. 321 Opponents of amendments have often tried to enjoin
that publication by challenging the legal sufficiency of state ratifications and by

320.
321.

M'Culloch v. State of Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheaton) 316, 405, 431, 435-36 (1819).
1 U.S.C. § 106(b).
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requesting the return of ratification certificates. 322 As the questions around the legal
sufficiency of ratifications mount, especially in the case of the ERA, they settle on
the Archivist and his power to judge the merit of any legal challenges in deciding
whether or not to publish an amendment. And not surprisingly, the lack of
precedent and reliable practice contributes to further uncertainties that keep us
wandering in circles through our Article V wonderland.
1 U.S.C. § 106(b) is the only legislation governing the procedural details of the
Article V amendment process, and it provides that
Whenever official notice is received at the National Archives and Records
Administration that any amendment proposed to the Constitution of the
United States has been adopted, according to the provisions of the
Constitution, the Archivist of the United States shall forthwith cause the
amendment to be published, with his certificate, specifying the States by
which the same may have been adopted, and that the same has become
valid, to all intents and purposes, as a part of the Constitution of the
United States.3 23
This statute leaves open a host of important questions, such as what state official
should notify the Archivist; is the Archivist's publication necessary for the
amendment to be legally effective; does Congress or the President have any role in
publishing an amendment; and if there are questions as to the legal sufficiency of
any state certifications, what does the Archivist do while we await judicial
determination? Nothing in the statute suggests that this is anything but a purely
ministerial role, and nothing suggests the Archivists undertake a judicial analysis to
determine the legal sufficiency of the states' ratifications. But fortunately, we have
a few guideposts, cryptic as they are.
The Supreme Court in Dillon held that an amendment becomes effective on
the date of the last state to ratify. 324 There is no requirement that the Archivist
certify the amendment or that Congress proclaim its passage. Justice Van Devanter,
writing for the majority in Dillon, stated that "ratification by these assemblies in
three-fourths of the States shall be taken as a decisive expression of the people's
will and be binding on all."325 However, the time gap between ratification and
publication has been recognized by commentators as creating undesirable uncertainty,
a situation fully embraced by the ERA. Corwin and Ramsey concluded that
[I]n view of the decision in Dillon v. Gloss that an amendment takes effect
on the date of the final ratification required for its adoption, rather than
on the date when it is proclaimed, there is a further possibility of a period

322. Wise v. Chandler, 108 S.W.2d 1024 (Ky. 1937); Chase v. Billings, 170 A. 903 (Vt. 1934).
323.
1 U.S.C. § 106(b), (Added Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655, § 2(b), 65 Stat. 710; amended
Pub. L. 98-497, title I, § 107(d), Oct. 19, 1984, 98 Stat. 2291).
324. 256 U.S. 368, 374-76 (1921).
325. Id. at 374.
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of serious confusion and uncertainty while the validity of ratification is
being determined. 326
So what is a responsible Archivist to do? If he refuses to publish an
amendment after receiving the requisite number of certificates, he has potentially
violated his statutory duty, which requires publication upon receipt. If he publishes
the amendment and there are legal insufficiencies in one or more of the
ratifications, then he risks binding the courts and presumably his publication
exercises a purported discretion that he has the power to judge the sufficiency of
the ratifications. For as we have discussed above, ratification certificates are binding
on the courts. Of course, it is possible that the publication by the Archivist is not
the binding part, but rather the submission to the Archivist by the states is the legally
relevant act. He could also publish the amendment subject to a statement, as
Secretary Seward did with the Fourteenth Amendment, 327 so that it is considered
ratified on condition that the irregularities are determined by some court in the
future or by later ratifications to be irrelevant.
For once, the path ahead seems to be coming into focus. In the case of the
ERA, the Archivist should publish the Amendment with the caveat that there may
be legal questions to some of the state ratifications. In doing so, he will have abided
by his ministerial duty to publish when he has received the relevant number of
ratification certificates. He will not, through a refusal to publish, be relying on the
executive branch or some nonjudicial body's opinion as to the sufficiency of the
late and rescinded ratifications. And since it appears to be the case that the
certificates of ratification are deemed conclusive once they have been submitted by
the states and not once they have been counted by the Archivist, his act is not
binding on the courts. Walking backwards, we can see how this might get us out of
our dilemma.
In 1920, a petition was brought against Acting Secretary of State, Frank Polk,
after he certified the Eighteenth Amendment. 328 The petitioner sought a writ of
mandamus commanding the Secretary of State to cancel the proclamation and
certification because the petitioner believed the Amendment had been invalidly
adopted. 329 The District Court distinguished between the certification of the
Amendment and the actual validity of the adoption: "As soon as he had received
the notices from 36 of the states that the amendment had been adopted, he was
obliged, under the statute, to put forth his proclamation. No discretion was lodged
in him. The act required was purely ministerial." 330 The court further held that
canceling the Acting Secretary of States' proclamation and certificate wouldn't
change the fact that the Eighteenth Amendment had been ratified. The Eighteenth

326.
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Corwin & Ramsey, supranote 56, at 211.
See supranote 158 and accompanying text.

328.
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United States ex rel. Widenmann v. Colby, 265 F. 998, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1920).
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Amendment had already become part of the Constitution when it was ratified by
the necessary number of states regardless of whether Polk acted to certify the
33
Amendment. 1

The Supreme Court agreed that the submission of the certificates by the states
was the legally relevant act in Lesets challenge to the Nineteenth Amendment. 332
The Court held that Tennessee and West Virginia both had the power to ratify the
Amendment and that "official notice to the Secretary, duly authenticated, that they
had done so was conclusive upon him and, being certified to by his proclamation,
is conclusive upon the courts." 333
In 1987, the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut considered
whether 1 U.S.C. § 106(b) was an improper delegation of power by Congress to the
Secretary of State.3 34 The court held that the "language of article 5 also demonstrates
that a constitutional amendment is valid when ratified, and, as a result, that the act
of certification is ministerial in nature . . . Since the ultimate authority to ratify lies
within the states, their official declaration of ratification is conclusive on
the Secretary." 335
These cases continue the constitutional paradox of our Article V wonderland.
If a state's ratification is conclusive, and the Archivist's role is purely ministerial,
then there is no room to judge the legal sufficiency of any state's ratification once
it has issued from the state house. The Archivist must simply count the number of
ratifications and, if they have reached the requisite number, he must publish the
amendment. But what if, as in the case of the ERA, there are legitimate questions
about the constitutionality of the congressional deadline or the purported state
rescissions? May the Archivist await a judicial determination of the legal sufficiency
of the three ratifications that occurred after the deadline? Or must the Archivist
publish the amendment, noting that legal questions exist around the tardy
ratifications and the purported rescissions as was done by Secretary of State Seward
with the Fourteenth Amendment?
Furthering the paradox, on March 5, 2021, District Court Judge Rudolph
Contreras granted the Archivist's motion to dismiss in a suit brought by the States
of Virginia, Illinois, and Nevada to force the Archivist to publish the ERA. 336 Judge
Contreras held that the late-ratifying states had no standing because the Archivist's
promulgation had no legal effect. Since the Archivist's duty is purely ministerial,
whether it performs that duty or not has no legal impact on the ERA or on the

331.
Id. at 1000 ("Its validity does not depend in any wise upon the proclamation. It is the
approval of the requisite number of states, not the proclamation, that gives vitality to the amendment
and makes it a part of the supreme law of the land.").
Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922).
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rights of the plaintiff states. "[The Archivist's] refusal to publish and certify the
ERA ... does not cause them a concrete injury that could be remedied by ordering
him to act." 337 Because the Archivist's act is not legally significant, mandamus
against the Archivist provides no relief and therefore the states lack standing.
But how then should the states proceed to obtain a judicial determination on
the validity of the late ratifications and the rescissions? They cannot sue Congress
because Congress has no further role. They cannot sue the executive because the
President has no role to play. They cannot sue the other states to, for instance,
determine the validity of the late ratifications or the rescissions because, as
independent actors in a federal dance, what the other states do does not affect the
individual plaintiff states. This leaves only the Archivist as the only potential
defendant in a suit to determine whether the ERA has been validly ratified. Thus,
even if the Archivist's publication of the ERA is a purely ministerial act with no
legal significance, the Archivist is the only federal actor with any role to play once
the last state has ratified.
The better reasoning is that the Archivist must publish the Amendment but
may indicate that there are legal questions about the sufficiency of some of the state
ratifications. The legal sufficiency can then be determined by a court faced with a
plaintiff who is challenging the applicability of a law that was passed pursuant to the
questionable amendment. 338 In undertaking its analysis, however, the court should
not treat the ratifications as conclusive of legal sufficiency, for doing so would
abdicate the court's responsibility to interpret the Constitution. Thorough judicial
review, although after certification, would be far preferable than the Archivist
judging the legal sufficiency of the state ratifications on his own, or even with advice
from the Justice Department. The Archivist is not a lawyer, the publication process
is not the act that makes a law legally binding, and the Archivist and Attorney
General are executive branch officials who have no role in the Article V process. 339
This is a delicate question, however, as compliance with state ratifying procedure
would seem to be a state court issue, while determining whether the states have
ratified pursuant to Article V would appear to be a federal constitutional issue. And
although the issues may dovetail, they are not necessarily coextensive.
In United States

v. Colby, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held

[T]he Acting Secretary of State ... was not required, or authorized, to
investigate and determine whether or not the notices stated the truth. To

337.
Id. at 45.
338.
This was the process used in Dillon, where the defendant was charged with unlawful
transportation of alcohol in violation of the Volstead Act, passed pursuant to the Eighteenth
Amendment and would be available after January 27, 2022, for the ERA. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921).
339.
See Elder, supr note 18, at 73-79.
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accept them as doing so, if in due form, was his duty .... No discretion
was lodged in him. The act required was purely ministerial.340
Because the Archivist is not authorized to judge the legal sufficiency of state
ratifications, that task must logically lie with the courts. But the small hiccup of
the two-year window before the ERA becomes effective means that no individual
plaintiff can sue for two years. During that time, we must simply wait out the
legitimacy limbo to see if the Twenty-Eighth Amendment has been validly ratified
because, according to Judge Contreras, no one has standing to sue.3 41 How can
there be profound constitutional issues of first impression regarding one of the
most important amendments of our time, and how can the issues be deemed
unresolvable just because there is no one in any government who can be sued? That
is an "atrocious way to run a constitution." 342 This is not to say that if the Archivist
issued a conditional certification as to the validity of the ERA that the legal issues
would go away, but it would provide a place to start mapping our way out of the
Article V wonderland.
CONCLUSION

Whether the ERA has validly become the Twenty-Eighth Amendment is a
matter of keen importance, not just for women but for the sake of our Article V
jurisprudence. Numerous matters of technical detail remain indeterminate, leaving
the ERA in legitimacy limbo. For over two centuries, Article V has operated
relatively smoothly with a judicial presumption in favor of ratification as Congress
and the courts skirted serious questions about amendment procedures. For the first
time, however, we have reached a point where the lack of judicial answers about the
constitutionality of the congressional deadline and the state rescissions risks
invalidating a constitutional amendment that has met the technical requirements of
Article V. Furthermore, unreliable dicta emerging from exceptional cases has been
misunderstood by scholars as establishing precedents that Congress may impose
deadlines on the states or that Congress has the sole authority to determine Article
V issues. And for only the second time, the Archivist must comply with his statutory
duty to certify a constitutional amendment that involves serious questions about the
legal sufficiency of state ratifications.
Not since the Eighteenth Amendment have there been so many questions
about constitutional amendment procedures, nor has a fully ratified amendment
been held in legitimacy limbo for so long. Fortunately, we have two years before the
amendment becomes effective in order to settle these matters. But the ERA has

340. United States ex rel. Widenmann v. Colby, 265 F. 998, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1920) (emphasis
added).
341. Ferriero, 525 F. Supp. 3d. at 45.
342. Joint Resolution Extending the Deadline for the Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment:
Hearing on H.J. Res. 638 Before the Subcomm. on Civ. and Const. Rts. of the Comm. on the Judiciay of
the H.R., 95th Cong. 138 (1977-1978) (testimony of Prof Van Alstyne).
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been ninety-seven years in the making and, for many people hoping for a sex-based
equality mandate, their patience is gone. It is truly an atrocious way to run a
constitution to have so few answers to so many technical questions. But, at the
end of the day, there is a logical path through the uncertain terrain of Article V.
The federal courts should exercise their jurisdiction to interpret the balance of
power between the states and Congress, and they should do so with a keen
understanding of the states' important role in the amendment process. Ambiguities
and doubts should be resolved in favor of the states that have the power to
determine whether, and when, the political, social, and economic conditions are ripe
for constitutional change. For that is the structure the founders intended; they
provided a mechanism for the states to rein in a national legislature that was out of
touch and to rein in states that would not comply with the great promise of a just
and equitable democracy.
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